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SOME THIRTY-FIVE years  after  the major  growth  in unions  in the United 
States,  the literature  on inflation  reveals no consensus  over the role of 
collective  bargaining  in wage inflation.  The contrast  between the am- 
bivalence  of the professional  literature  toward union influence  and the 
concern  of policy  officials  with  the development  of negotiated  wages  seems 
particularly  acute  during  the biennial  and  triennial  renegotiations  of labor 
contracts  in important  industries.  Most nonprofessional  observers of 
these  "wage  rounds"  would  be surprised  to learn  that  they  apparently  lead 
no life of their  own  in many  wage-adjustment  models. 
The lack of explicit  attention  to union activity  in many  models  usually 
rests on one of two standard  justifications.  First, unlike those in other 
industrialized  nations,  labor  unions  in the United States  represent  a rela- 
tively  small fraction  of the labor force, leading  some authors  to assume 
that  events  in the organized  sector  would have little effect  on the general 
level of money  wages.  Second,  standard  formulations  of price  theory  pre- 
dict  that  unions  that succeed  in monopolizing  labor  supply  will achieve  a 
once-and-for-all  relative-wage  advantage  but will have no long-term  in- 
flationary  influence.  Therefore,  changes in the degree of labor market 
monopoly  will influence  the rate of wage inflation,  but unions  should  not 
exert an independent  influence  once that degree  becomes stable. (Even 
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these formulations  implicitly  assume  rigidity  of nonunion  wages mn  the 
face of an increase  in the supply of labor to the nonunion  sector that 
should result  from reduced  employment  opportunities  in the union sec- 
tor.) In fact, several  previous  studies have reported  a positive relation 
between  the rate of change  of money wages and changes  in trade  union 
membership  (a purported  proxy  for union militancy)  in both the United 
Kingdom  and  the United  States.' 
Taken at face value, this argument  seems to justify  neglect  of the role 
of collective  bargaining  in postwar  inflation  in the United States,  for the 
extent of unionization  has been quite stable over this period. The main 
dynamic  element  has been the spread  of unionization  among  public em- 
ployees,  which  has essentially  offset  a relative  decline  in the private  sector, 
where  employment  has grown  most  rapidly  in occupations  and  geographic 
areas  that are  not traditional  bastions  of union  strength. 
An alternate  view holds that the impact  of collective  bargaining  settle- 
ments extends well beyond their own immediate  domains as wage in- 
creases  in one sector are emulated  by workers  elsewhere.  The purported 
importance  of institutional  wage interdependence  receives  particular  em- 
phasis when, as in 1976, there is a round of highly  visible negotiations 
in major  industries.  Given their coverage,  these settlements  are unlikely 
to be of serious  policy  concern  by themselves.  (In 1976, for example,  con- 
tracts  resulting  from major  collective  bargaining  negotiations  established 
terms  and  conditions  of employment  for 4.4 million  workers,  or 5 percent 
of total nonagricultural  employment.)  Therefore,  it must  be the potential 
role of these settlements  in the formation  of wage expectations  by work- 
ers in other  sectors  that  is at the root of policy concern  and  certain  appli- 
1. A. G. Hines, "Trade  Unions and Wage Inflation  in the United Kingdom, 1893- 
1961," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 31  (October 1964),  pp. 221-52;  A.  G. 
Hines, "Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom, 1948-62: A Disaggregated Study," 
Economic Journal,  vol. 79 (March 1969), pp. 66-89; 0.  C. Ashenfelter, G. E. John- 
son, and J. H. Pencavel, "Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages 
in United States Manufacturing Industry," Review of  Economic Studies, vol.  39 
(January 1972), pp. 27-54. These studies  are consistent  with those of the influence  of 
unions on relative wages, which conclude that most unions establish a relative-wage 
advantage  over the nonunion sector shortly after organizing  the relevant  labor force. 
Although this markup fluctuates  cyclically, there normally is no secular trend in the 
union-nonunion differential.  The standard  reference is H. G. Lewis, Unionism and 
Relative Wages in the United States: An Empirical Inquiry (University of Chicago 
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cations  of incomes  policy.2  Increases  in "key"  wages  may be imitated  in 
other negotiations  within the organized  sector. Moreover,  labor econo- 
mists  have  recognized  that  "threat"  and  "morale"  effects  may  induce  wage 
spillovers  to the nonunion  sector.' Clearly,  if contagion  to the nonunion 
sector  is widespread,  the potential  for union influence  on movements  in 
the general  level of money wages is greater  than the simple statistics  on 
unionization  suggest.  Threat  effects,  however,  may be more  likely during 
periods  with more  aggressive  union  organizing  than  has characterized  the 
private  sector  in the United  States  in the past  twenty  years. 
The extent of imitation  of contractual  wages is of interest  for several 
reasons.  First,  if wage  contagion  is pervasive,  the allocative  role of wages 
in the economy  may be substantially  reduced.  Collective  bargaining  may 
prevent the emergence  of wage differentials  that are necessary  for the 
prompt  reallocation  of labor  from  one industry  to another.  A second and 
related  issue  involves  the limitations  on standard  macroeconomic  policies 
implied  by a labor  market  in which  contagion  dominates  wage  determina- 
tion. If current  changes  in union  wages  in sector  i are influenced  by past 
wage changes  in sector  j as well as by current  market  conditions  in sector 
i, the responsiveness  of negotiated  wages to changing  market  conditions 
(the targets  of standard  monetary  and fiscal policy) may be greatly  re- 
duced, or the response  may operate with long lags. This insulation  of 
wages from standard  policy may be deepened  to the extent  that the key 
bargains  or wage leaders  involve  long-term  agreements.  Even if currently 
negotiated  wage  changes  were  responsive  to market  conditions,  they  would 
tend to be dominated  by deferred  increases  from contracts  negotiated  in 
earlier  years. In the face of extreme  contagion,  there may be a case for 
auxiliary  policies.  Knowing  whether  wage contagion  has reached  the epi- 
demic  stage  can be important  in designing  and assessing  the potential  role 
of policies or structural  reform  of the industrial  relations  system. 
2.  For example, it is widely believed that some form of pattern following domi- 
nates wage determination  in durable-goods  manufacturing,  and this belief has formed 
the basis for some models of wage determination.  See Otto Eckstein and Thomas A. 
Wilson, "The Determination of  Money Wages in American Industry," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 76 (August 1962), pp. 379-414.  However, these studies 
have generally asserted  rather than tested for the existence of wage imitation within 
a particular  group of industries.  Moreover, they assume that contract renegotiations 
are clustered  in time, and this has become less true over the postwar period. 
3. For one formulation, see S. Rosen, 'Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and 
the Extent of  Organization,"  Review of Economic Studies, vol.  36  (April 1969), 
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This paper examines  the issue of the interdependence  of negotiated 
wages in the United States, and analyzes  wage interactions  between  the 
union and nonunion  sectors.  It departs,  therefore,  from previous  studies 
in certain  respects.  Most important,  wage  interdependence  is viewed  from 
the perspective  of labor markets  as defined  by contractual  relationships. 
Studies  of aggregate  changes  in earnings,  particularly  those that  are  mute 
on the role of unions, obscure  important  differences  in the process of 
wage  adjustment  under  different  market  structures  or contractual  arrange- 
ments. This treatment  conflicts  with the disaggregations  emphasized  in 
some  modern  theories  of inflation.4 
Some earlier  studies  have examined  wage  interdependence  among  geo- 
graphic  labor markets,  focusing  on the role of potential  migration  in the 
pattern of wage change across regions. Others have tested for inter- 
industry  wage spillovers.5  The former  rely on more or less competitive 
processes  and do not consider  contractual  relationships,  which  frequently 
cut across the geographic  boundaries  by which data are organized.  The 
latter may reflect contractual  relationships,  but suffer  because in using 
earnings  data, they combine  wage adjustments  in the union and the non- 
union sectors  although  the differences  in the contractual  relationships  are 
generally  so great that the wage-adjustment  process for the two could 
differ  substantially.  Moreover,  the use of earnings  data combines  move- 
ments in contractual  wages and wage drift. The analysis  in this paper  is 
confined  to the  former  class  of adjustments. 
The subsequent  sections pursue the issue of wage interdependence. 
First,  the pressures  for imitation  are  briefly  reviewed,  and  an extreme  view 
of the spillover  process-that all wage  changes  are the same-is  assessed 
by a comparison  of the distributions  of wage change  for union and non- 
union  workers.  This is followed  by regression  analyses  of interactions  be- 
tween  union and  nonunion  wage  changes,  which  include  an assessment  of 
the impact of the Nixon administration's  incomes policy on union and 
4.  See Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," BPEA, 
2:1975, pp. 351-90; John Hicks, The Crisis in Keynesian Economics (Basic Books, 
1975). 
5.  See particularly Frank Brechling, "Wage Inflation and the Structure of  Re- 
gional Unemployment,"  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 5  (February 
1973, pt. 2),  pp. 355-79; and Lester D. Taylor, Stephen J. Turnovsky, and Thomas 
A. Wilson, The Inflationary  Process in North American Manufacturing (University 
of Toronto, Institute for the Quantitative  Analysis of Social and Economic Policy, 
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nonunion  wages.  The final section  tests for wage interdependence  among 
several  major  labor  contracts. 
How Similar  Are  Wage  Changes? 
In the literature  on industrial  relations,  discussions  of movements  in 
union wages have long emphasized  the role of "custom"  or "coercive 
comparisons"  in maintaining  stable relative  wages among  various  skills, 
occupations,  and  industries.  However,  the focus on wage  developments  in 
the unionized  sectors  has obscured  the role of wage imitation  in unorga- 
nized  markets.  Wage  similarity  among  firms  competing  in the same  prod- 
uct and labor  markets  is no less than what economic  theory  predicts.  An 
employer  can, of course,  postpone  wage adjustments  until  the market  sig- 
nals that his wage  is higher  or lower  than desired  (for example,  by an in- 
crease  in the applicant  or quit  rate). However,  a firm  may find  it cheaper 
to maintain  its relative  position  by imitating  the wage changes  in "refer- 
ence"  firms  in the relevant  product  and  labor  markets.  This  is the  behavior 
underlying  equilibrium-wage  movements  in many  job-search  models;  em- 
pirically,  it explains  why  many  nonunion  firms  subscribe  to and  participate 
in wage  surveys  of their  industry.  Among  many  nonunion  firms,  wage  imi- 
tation and the resulting  wage pattern simply economize on personnel 
costs., 
On the union side, the motivations  are more complicated.  The union 
leadership  is presumed  to gain utility  from both higher  wages and more 
employment  of the membership.  Under this formulation,  union leaders 
may, to the extent necessary  to preserve  union membership,  share the 
employer's  perspective  on the appropriate  range of wage comparisons. 
The rank and file, however,  is likely to emphasize  traditional  wage rela- 
tionships  in the development  of bargaining  positions.  The perspective  of 
the rank and file follows from a straightforward  consideration  of losses 
and gains  under  alternative  bargaining  strategies.  Most  members  will gain 
from the maintenance  of traditional  wage differentials  if this justifies  in- 
creasing  wages; only a few will lose their jobs from subsequent  adjust- 
6.  For an early development of this point, see M. W. Reder, "The Theory of 
Union  Wage  Policy," Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics, vol.  34  (February 
1952), pp. 34-45.  For some evidence on wage patterns among nonunion firms, see 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Structure of Labor Markets: Wages and Labor Mobility 
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ments in employment.  Since layoffs are governed  by seniority  arrange- 
ments  under  most union contracts,  it is clear  who is at risk, and the rank 
and file have no difficulty  in deciding  where  their  bargaining  interest  lies. 
Union leaders  who stray  too far from their  objectives  in bargaining  risk 
nonratification  of the contract  and  ultimately  loss of office.  Moreover,  the 
bargaining  goals of the rank and file have presumably  received  greater 
weight  since the passage  in 1959 of the Landrum-Griffin  Act, which  pro- 
vides for federal  supervision  of rerun  elections  of union officers  in situa- 
tions in which election  irregularities  have been proved. 
Clearly,  the problems  and possibilities  of wage distortion  in a system 
of wage imitation  or pattern  following  develop  only when employers  and 
unions  form different  wage references  and when the union dominates  in 
bargaining.  Even in the unionized  sector, institutional  arrangements  are 
sufficiently  diverse  that rigid  wage imitation  is difficult.  The influence  of 
market  forces  should  be even  greater  in the nonunion  sector.  Yet some  dis- 
cussions  of wage  determination  come  close to maintaining  that  once  wages 
are settled  in a few key sectors,  wage changes  are largely  determined  for 
the rest of the economy. In this section, the merit of this rigid (naive) 
hypothesis  of wage  interdependence  is assessed  by examining  data  on the 
dispersion  of wage changes  in the union and nonunion  sectors  of manu- 
facturing.  In subsequent  sections,  less stringent  wage-imitation  hypotheses 
will be examined. 
Only one source  appears  to provide  separate  time series  of union and 
nonunion  wage  changes  in the  United  States.  The  wage  series  are  a product 
of the survey,  Wage  Developments  in Manufacturing,  of the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.  The data, restricted  to total manufacturing,  are pub- 
lished annually  in the Bureau's  Current  Wage  Developments.  The union 
wage changes are obtained from data for major collective bargaining 
agreements  (covering  at least 1,000 workers) and a sample of smaller 
union  establishments.  The nonunion  data  cover  general  wage  increases  in 
a sample  of nonunion  establishments,  which  give either  general  increases 
alone or a combination  of general  and merit increases.  Thus, for some 
firms  in the sample,  the omission  of merit  increases  means  that the data 
understate  total wage changes.  Establishments  that grant  merit  increases 
only or that adjust  wages on an individual  basis are not included.7 
7.  The weighted average of  union and nonunion wage changes in the survey, 
Wage Developments in Manufacturing,  typically falls below the rate of change of 
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Table  1. Coefficient  of Variation  and  Standard  Deviation  of 
Effective  Annual  Percentage  Wage  Changes  for 
Union  and  Nonunion  Workers  in Manufacturing,  1961-75k 
Union  Nonunion 
Coefficient  of  Standard  Coefficient  of  Standard 
Period  variation  deviation  variation  deviation 
1961-63  0.732  1.843  1.101  2.560 
1964-66  0.536  1.495  0.571  1.786 
1967-69  0.441  2.125  0.495  2.328 
1970-72  0.412  2.603  0.528  2.293 
1973-75  0.364  2.823  0.432  2.811 
Sources:  1960-63, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Summary  Release: Wage Developments in Manu- 
facturing, 1960" (October 1961), and ibid.,  "1961," "1962," "1963" (September 1962, November  1963, 
and December 1964, respectively); 1964-68, John Kinyon, "A Report on Wage Developments in Manu- 
facturing, 1968," Monthly Labor Review, vol.  92 (August  1969), pp. 33-39;  1969-75, Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics, Current Wage Developments,  annual article in relevant volumes. 
a.  Effective wage is defined as current wage plus deferred wage increase, plus cost-of-living Increase. 
These data have an important  bearing  on the naive wage-interdepen- 
dence hypothesis.  If pattern following dominates  wage determination 
within  the union  sector  but "threat"  influences  (spillovers  to the nonunion 
sector) are weak, the dispersion  of wage adjustments  should  be smaller 
for organized  workers  than for unorganized  workers.  Unfortunately,  the 
data  are  too thin  to provide  a conclusive  test of wage  interactions  between 
the union and nonunion  sectors  or between  union settlements  in manu- 
facturing  and nonmanufacturing,  or of a less rigid  wage interdependence 
among  unions  within  the manufacturing  sector.  These topics  are pursued 
in subsequent  sections. 
The distribution  of effective  annual  wage changes  by union affiliation 
appears  in table 1.8 Since most unions in manufacturing  are not free to 
adjust  their  wages  annually  (except  via predetermined  deferred  increases) 
and because  the loading  of wage increases  over the contract  period  may 
creases in earnings above contractual wage-rate changes in the union sector-the 
wage-drift  factor-are  one source of the gap. Furthermore,  as noted in the text, non- 
union wage changes are understated  to an unknown extent in the data in Wage De- 
velopments in Manufacturing  since the survey does not record merit increases that 
are granted in addition to general wage increases in nonunion firms. See Diane C. 
Bayless, "Union and Nonunion Workers in Manufacturing  Received Record Wage 
Gains in 1974," Current Wage Developments,  vol. 27  (July  1975),  p. 51. 
8.  Effective  wage changes include cost-of-living  increases,  deferred  wage increases 
from agreements  reached in earlier years, and current  wage decisions. The deferred 
component is relatively unimportant  in the nonunion sector. 642  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
vary,  three-year  averages  are  presented.  The table  reveals  the inadequacy 
of the naive version of rigid wage interdependence.  In the data under- 
lying  these  computations,  union  workers  received  wage  increases  amount- 
ing to as little as zero and as much  as 10 percent  in the early  years  of the 
period and, more recently,  ranging  from zero to over 13 percent.  While 
this hardly rules out spillovers,  it pretty  well undermines  the view that 
current  wage adjustments  among  organized  workers  play the rigid game 
of follow the leader that characterized  a few wage rounds  early in the 
postwar  years.9 
The coefficients  of variation  in table 1 also show that the dispersion  of 
nonunion  wage changes  in manufacturing  around  the median wage in- 
crease exceeds the dispersion  of union wage changes-a  finding  that is 
consistent  with greater  wage  interdependence  among  groups  of unionized 
workers,  although  the test is hardly  a strong  one. (A comparison  of the 
two dispersion  measures  in table 1 indicates  that  the growth  in the median 
wage  increase  over the period  is responsible  for the marked  decline  in the 
coefficient  of variation.) Closer scrutiny  of the underlying  data reveals 
that virtually  all the difference  is due to the greater  frequency  of zero 
increases  in the nonunion  sector in most years. This frequency  is quite 
sensitive  cyclically.  Thus,  the percent  of nonunion  workers  receiving  posi- 
tive wage changes  rose from a low of 54 in 1961 (the union figure  was 
83.3) to a high of 90.1 in 1973 (when the union  figure  was 95.9). When 
workers  receiving  no wage change are ignored  in the computations,  the 
dispersion  of wage increases  is generally  somewhat  greater  in the union 
sector.'0 
9. This conclusion holds if one focuses instead on absolute wage changes or wage 
and benefit changes. It also corresponds  with early case studies of wage settlements 
within the jurisdiction  of major unions. Indeed, the most interesting finding of the 
literature  on wage contagion in the fifties was the apparent  fragility  of wage patterns. 
Even within the jurisdiction  of the United Automobile Workers  or the United Steel- 
workers, wages typically deviated from the pattern in response to unfavorable eco- 
nomic conditions. However, these deviations occurred  only in the smaller plants and 
deviations were more frequent in fringe benefits and work-rule  enforcement than in 
wages. Harold M. Levinson, "Pattern  Bargaining:  A Case Study of the Automobile 
Workers,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 74 (May 1960), pp. 296-317;  and 
George Seltzer, "Pattern  Bargaining  and the United Steelworkers,"  Journal of Politi- 
cal Economy,vol. 59 (August 1951),pp.  319-31. 
10. For the record, downward  wage flexibility is virtually unheard of in employ- 
ment contracts in either sector. Even in the economic doldrums of the early sixties, 
general wage decreases were never experienced by more than 0.1 percent of union 
workers and 0.4 percent of nonunion workers in any year. These data (from the Robert  J. Flanagan  643 
The results  of this section  are  easily  summarized.  The naive  wage-inter- 
dependence  hypothesis  of thoroughgoing  imitation  fails decidedly  as a 
description  of wage determination  in both the union and the nonunion 
sectors of manufacturing.  While students of labor markets  have long 
recognized  that  strong  tendencies  toward  imitation  in the determination  of 
official  job rates  are  consistent  with significant  interfirm  and  interindustry 
variation  in the rate of change of actual earnings (via wage drift), the 
data reviewed  in the section  show that even changes  in negotiated  union 
wage rates exhibit significant  variation  and in some years do not differ 
substantially  from the dispersion  of changes  in nonunion  wages. If con- 
tagion  occurs,  it apparently  does not reach  epidemic  proportions. 
Nevertheless,  this version of the contagion  hypothesis  could well be 
regarded  as a caricature  of institutional  wage interdependencies.  It does 
not rule out some less stringent  form of wage influence  among groups 
of union  workers.  In fact, the somewhat  lower  and  less cyclically  sensitive 
dispersion  in the organized  sector suggests  some role for alternative  hy- 
potheses  of wage  interdependence.  Nor do the findings  rule  out the possi- 
bility  that,  for a given  dispersion,  the size of money-wage  changes  in these 
sectors  is subject  to wage  developments  elsewhere.  These  possibilities  are 
examined  below. 
Spilovers  among  Major  Sectors 
Since  the spread  of unionization  in the late thirties  and early  forties,  it 
has often been assumed  that movements  in union wages  are relatively  in- 
sulated  from  labor  market  pressure  and  hence  from  the  influence  of macro- 
economic  policy. Although  some studies  of aggregate  earnings  have de- 
rived empirical  support  for this proposition,":  there is no consensus  as 
to the institutional  factors that might be responsible.  A clearer  under- 
standing  of why a recession  may not put much "bite"  on union wages 
seems desirable  before standard  monetary  and fiscal  policies are supple- 
mented  by auxiliary  policies aimed at moderating  wage increases. 
There are several  potential  explanations  of cyclically  insensitive  wage 
table  1 sources)  are not, however, corrected for variations in labor quality and 
hence do not reflect effective wage cuts that occur via demotion or other wage-drift 
mechanisms. 
11. See, for example,  Ashenfelter  and others, "Trade  Unions." 644  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
changes. First, for internal  political reasons developed  in the previous 
section, unions  may simply  ignore  market  conditions  in setting  wage ob- 
jectives,  except  in cases  of serious  threat  to employment  and  membership. 
Second, current  market  conditions  may in fact influence  currently  nego- 
tiated union wage changes, but deferred  wage increases  negotiated  in 
previous  years  may dominate  average  changes.  With  the spread  of multi- 
year labor agreements  in the postwar  period, wages negotiated  in any 
given  year  cover  less than  half  of the organized  workers  receiving  increases 
during  that  year.  As a result,  the inertia  of deferred  increases  may  dampen 
the response  of union wages to current  policy stimuli,  even though  cur- 
rently  negotiated  wages  may  be as cyclically  sensitive  as nonunion  wages.12 
Finally, union wage demands  may be influenced  by "equity"  considera- 
tions as well as current  market  conditions.  Where  the equity objective 
takes  the form  of maintaining  a target  relative  wage  and  where  the  relative- 
wage patterns  tend to be disturbed  before a deflationary  period,  macro- 
economic policy may not have much influence  on even currently  nego- 
tiated wages. To the extent that nonunion  employers  seek to maintain  a 
differential  with the union sector, the insulation  of wages from market 
stimuli  could spread  throughout  the economy.  If this form of wage  inter- 
dependence  is important,  a crucial  empirical  issue  is the speed  with  which 
wages  adjust  to reestablish  the target  differential. 
The empirical  analysis  in this section  seeks  to establish  the weight  to be 
accorded  these alternatives  and their  role in recent  wage  behavior.  Wage 
determination  is examined  separately  for the union  and nonunion  sectors 
in an effort  to describe  more fully the differences  in the underlying  be- 
havior, and to bring out interactions  that are obscured  in the earnings 
data.  In evaluating  the results,  it should  be recognized  that  observed  earn- 
ings changes  are not a simple weighted  average  of wage changes  in the 
union and nonunion  sectors.  To clarify  the relation  between  the analysis 
in this section and standard  wage-adjustment  models using earnings  as 
the dependent  variable,  consider 
(1)  T( W  +  b)  +  (1-  TF 
in which the rate of change  of earnings,  E, is expressed  as the weighted 
average  of wage developments  for union and nonunion  workers (T is 
the percentage  of organized  workers). Wage changes in the organized 
12. For some simulation evidence on this point, see Martin Neil Baily's article 
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sector  will  reflect  the rate  of change  of negotiated  wages,  WV',  plus  the con- 
tribution  of wage drift, D. Earnings  may drift from negotiated  rates in 
the organized  sector  because  the duration  of many labor agreements  in- 
hibits immediate  negotiated  adjustments  to unanticipated  variations  in 
the determinants  of wages and also because  of the centralization  of bar- 
gaining  structures  in some  sectors."'  These  features  of wage  determination 
appear  less important  in the nonunion  sector;  recall from the previous 
section, for example,  the sensitivity  of the percent  of nonunion  workers 
receiving  general  wage  increases  to changing  economic  conditions.  Hence, 
the wage changes  of unorganized  workers,  WI, are assumed  to be free 
of a drift  component.  The drift  component,  or tendency  for observed  eam- 
ings  increases  to exceed  the weighted  average  of union  and  nonunion  wage 
changes,  has been of some importance  since 1967. Between 1967 and 
1973, drift  in manufacturing  varied  between  0.7 and 1.8 percent  per  year, 
computed  on a base of average  hourly  earnings  adjusted  for overtime  and 
interindustry  shifts. 
In principle,  wage imitation  can influence  any component  of equation 
1, and thus reduce  the responsiveness  of earnings  changes  to changes  in 
macroeconomic  policy. However, the empirical  tests in this paper are 
restricted  to spillovers  influencing  WI'  and WI",  as well as wage relation- 
ships within the unionized  sector. Although the size of the drift com- 
ponent  may reflect  union "equity"  objectives,  this influence  has generally 
been noted in countries  with centralized  collective  bargaining  systems  in 
which  attempts  by the labor  movement  to achieve  greater  equality  in the 
structure  of negotiated  rates are thwarted  by the subsequent  behavior  of 
drift."4  Such redistributional  efforts  are not as marked  or as capable  of 
coordination  in a bargaining  system  as decentralized  as that  in the United 
States,  where there are few barriers  to reestablishing  a perceived  distri- 
butional  anomaly  through  official  union  negotiations.  The role of drift  in 
the spillover  process  is therefore  left for another  paper. 
13. For a recent discussion  of these issues, see Robert E. Hall, "The Process of In- 
flation in the Labor Market,"  BPEA, 2:1974, pp. 343-93.  See also E. H. Phelps- 
Brown, "Wage  Drift,"  Economica, vol. 29 (November 1962), pp. 339-56. 
14. For some examples and some evidence, see T. L. Johnston, Collective Bar- 
gaining in Sweden (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962),  chap. 16; William 
Fellner and others, The Problem of Rising Prices (Paris: Organisation  for Euro- 
pean Economic Co-operation, 1961),  pp. 300-03;  and Organisation  for Economic 
Co-operation  and Development, Norway, OECD Economic Surveys (Paris: OECD, 
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Instead,  this  section  examines  the  wage  relationships  between  organized 
and unorganized  workers  in manufacturing  along  with  the influence  from 
union wage settlements  in nonmanufacturing  and the public sector. Be- 
ginning  with the union sector,  consider  a fairly  general  form  of a money- 
wage  adjustment  model, 
(2)  Wt  =  f(ut)  +  OWJ, 
in which f(u)  represents  disequilibrium  (market) forces and We repre- 
sents  the rate  of change  of expected  money  wages.  Clearly,  in a discussion 
of wage contagion,  the determinants  of expected  wages are crucial,  and 
the literature  suggests  three  main  influences  on wage  expectations. 
The most common hypothesis  concerning  wage expectations  is that 
workers  seek to maintain  their real standard  of living. This implies  the 
specification  Wt =  g5(P_),  where  P is prices,  which upon substitition 
into equation  2 yields the familiar  price-wage  process specified  in most 
empirical  wage-adjustment  equations. 
A second  assumption  is that  workers  seek to protect  their  share  of total 
income  and output.  Virtually  every  organized  labor  movement  advocates 
an increase  in labor's  share,  and functional  shares  are apparently  of im- 
portance  in motivating  wage demands  in some European  countries  with 
relatively  centralized  bargaining  arrangements.'5  However,  from the per- 
spective  of negotiators  of individual  labor  agreements  in the decentralized 
bargaining  system of the United States, macro distribution  goals are a 
futile objective.  On the other  hand,  profits  in the firm  or industry  of the 
union do provide  a realistic  target,  and thus profit  variables  have been 
included  in many empirical  models in an effort  to detect the effects  of 
institutional  forces. 
The third major expectations  hypothesis,  which has not received as 
much  empirical  attention  as one might  expect  given the folklore  of wage 
interdependence,  is that  union  wage  determination  is influenced  by notions 
of "fairness"  or "equity"  that are defined  by reference  to the wages re- 
ceived  by other  workers  in the same  union,  by workers  doing  similar  work 
in other  industries,  or by workers  in other  occupations  with  which  a differ- 
ential  has been maintained  by the force of custom.  From  this perspective, 
changes  in the rate of inflation,  in labor  market  conditions,  or in institu- 
15. For discussion  and evidence on this issue, see George L. Perry, "Determinants 
of Wage Inflation  around the World,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35;  and OECD. Ger 
many, Economic Surveys (Paris: OECD, 1975). Robert  J. Flanagan  647 
tional arrangements  (for example, bargaining  structures  and contract 
durations) attain much of their importance  in the inflationary  process 
through  their disturbing  influence  on the pattern  of relative  wages. Not 
only does the hypothesis  open up an array  of intersectoral  relationships, 
in which wages determined  by bargaining  or competitive  forces in one 
sector  may  influence  wages  elsewhere,  but  it opens  up mechanisms  through 
which government  redistribution  policies may be transmitted  to sectors 
that  are  not directly  influenced.'6  On the other  hand,  the hypothesis  offers 
no guidance  on the domain of wage interdependence.  If future wage 
changes  in sector i depend  in part on the current  wage in i relative  to 
sector  j, which  sectors  constitute  j? If all sectors  exert  an equal  influence, 
the naive  contagion  hypothesis  reasserts  itself,  but this has been ruled  out 
by results  such  as those  reported  in table 1. This  problem  is discussed  more 
thoroughly  when individual  contract  data are examined  below. 
EMPIRICAL  SPECIFICATION 
Each of the hypotheses  concerning  wage expectations  just discussed 
was incorporated  into the empirical  analysis  reported  below. The depen- 
dent variables  were alternately  the median  percentage  rate of change  of 
money  wages  for union  and  for nonunion  workers,  as reported  in the BLS 
surveys,  Wage  Developments  in Manufacturing,  described  in the previous 
section.  The dependent  variable  for the organized  sector  requires  further 
comment.  For union  workers,  the wage decisions  are taken  at the time of 
a contract  renegotiation,  so that the preferable  dependent  variable  would 
be the annual  rate of change  of the value of the contract  over its life. Un- 
fortunately,  data using this wage concept have not been available  long 
enough  for fruitful  econometric  analysis,  and  the same  is true  of data  that 
include  the value of fringe  benefits.  As an alternative  measure  of the out- 
come of current  union negotiations,  the rate of change  of money wages 
provided  for in the first  year  of currently  negotiated  contracts  is adopted. 
This measure  excludes  first-year  cost-of-living  adjustments  (COLA) and 
therefore  captures  wage responses  to market  and institutional  influences 
exerted up to the negotiations.  In the present analysis,  this wage con- 
cept captures  best the sensitivity  of union  wage  decisions  to current  labor 
16. Edward M. Gramlich, "Impact of  Minimum Wages on  Other Wages, Em- 
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market  conditions.  To assess  the drag  on union  wage  adjustments  attribu- 
table  to the  presence  of multiyear  contracts,  the  behavior  of effective  union 
wage  changes-current wage  changes  plus  deferred  increases,  plus COLA 
-is  also analyzed  and  compared  with  the results  for current  changes.  (A 
series  restricted  to deferred  wage  increases  is not available.) 
To get a period  sufficiently  long to permit  useful  analysis,  one must  rely 
on annual  data. In the regression  analysis,  the wage changes  are related 
to variables  representing  labor  market  pressure,  price  changes,  profits,  the 
incomes  policy  of the early  seventies,  and  relative-wage  comparisons,  each 
of which  is discussed  in the subsequent  paragraphs. 
Turning  first  to the role of labor  market  pressure  in wage  determination 
in the organized  sector,  both the lag structure  and the cyclical  sensitivity 
of wage changes  may differ  from those in the nonunion  sector.  The lag 
structure  of labor  market  influence  may  be affected  by the duration  of labor 
agreements.  Labor  market  pressure  may be a weak determinant  of union 
bargaining  demands  for two reasons.  First, in their  bargaining  behavior, 
unions are more interested  in the employment  of their current  member- 
ship  than  in the potential  size of their  membership.  Second,  in an environ- 
ment in which  bargaining  objectives  are politically  determined,  and  insti- 
tutional  rules  indicate  clearly  which  minority  is at risk, the majority  may 
rationally  decide to ignore market  pressures  in their wage demands.  In 
trial regressions  the "Perry-weighted"  series on the unemployment  rate 
was tested in linear and nonlinear  form as was an employment-change 
variable  constructed  by summing  the rate  of change  of production-worker 
employment  in each two-digit  manufacturing  sector  weighted  by the per- 
cent of union (or nonunion) workers  in that sector. Statistically,  it was 
not possible to choose between  models with general  and sector-specific 
labor market  pressure  in the analysis  of union wage changes.  The non- 
linear  unemployment  and  the weighted  employment-change  specifications 
were strongest  in the union sector  while  the linear  unemployment  specifi- 
cation  was superior  in the nonunion  sector.  The unemployment  specifica- 
tions are reported  for both sectors  to facilitate  comparisons.  Despite  con- 
siderable  experimentation  with lagged values of the variables  reflecting 
labor  market  pressure  in both  the  union  and  nonunion  regressions,  only  the 
current  values  were significant. 
Price changes  are assumed  to influence  workers  in all sectors  equally, 
and the preceding  December-to-December  change  of the consumer  price 
index  is used  for this purpose.  Experiments  with  alternative  lag structures 
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of price  influence  on wages.  First-year  wage  adjustments  in currently  nego- 
tiated  union agreements  are significantly  influenced  by price  changes  that 
occurred  up to two years  earlier,  as would  be expected  when  actual  price 
changes  differ  from expected  changes  in a sector  dominated  by two- and 
three-year  labor agreements.  On the other hand, only one-year  lags on 
price  changes  are  significant  in the nonunion  sector (where  wage  revisions 
are generally  considered  annually). In the regressions  on effective  union 
wage  change,  lags of longer  than  one year  are also insignificant.  Deferred 
contractual  wage increases  appear  to be based in part on price expecta- 
tions at the time of negotiations  that  run  counter  to later  price  experience 
sufficiently  to cancel  the lagged  influence  on first-year  negotiated  wages. 
The profit  rate, as many  have observed,  is not an independent  variable 
mandated  by any derivation  of disequilibrium  wage adjustments  in com- 
petitive  markets.  Instead,  it has been offered  as a determinant  of union 
wage  objectives  in wage  models  that  acknowledge  some  role for collective 
bargaining.  But this convention  has yielded puzzling  results.  The closer 
past studies  have come to isolating  wage  adjustments  for unionized  work- 
ers, the weaker  has been the role of profits.17  Nevertheless,  the influence 
of profits  on union wage changes  was investigated  in several  unreported 
regressions.  A profit  rate for the unionized  sector of manufacturing  was 
developed by summing  Federal Trade Commission  data on after-tax 
profits as a percent of stockholders'  equity in two-digit  manufacturing 
sectors  weighted  by the percent  of union workers  in each sector.  The re- 
sults were  fully consistent  with the findings  of other  studies  of the union- 
ized sector. Neither current  nor lagged  values of the level or change  in 
profits  were significantly  related  to negotiated  wage changes  in manufac- 
turing.  As a result,  profits  have not been included  in the results  reported 
below.18 
17. Indeed, there is some indication that profits variables have, if anything, been 
more significant in the determination of  nonunion wages. See the discussion in 
George E. Johnson, "Economic  Analysis of Trade Unionism," American Economic 
Review, vol. 65 (May 1975), pp. 23-28,  and studies cited therein. An earlier study 
of the contractual  union wage changes analyzed below found no significant  relation- 
ship between contractual  wages and the profit  rate. See Daniel S. Hamermesh,  "Wage 
Bargains,  Threshold Effects, and the Phillips Curve,"  Quarterly  Journal of Econom- 
ics, vol. 84 (August 1970), pp. 501-17. 
18. This result, along with the relatively short lag structures  on other independent 
variables, parallels the findings of a recent study of average hourly earnings spill- 
overs between groupings of  two-digit manufacturing industries. See Y.  P. Mehra, 
"Spillovers in Wage Determination in U.S.  Manufacturing  Industries,"  Review of 
Economics and Statistics,  vol. 58 (August 1976), pp. 300-12. 650  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
In mid-August  1971, the Nixon administration  initiated an incomes 
policy which ultimately  consisted of four phases. The first, a 90-day 
freeze, occurred  after most of the  major 1971 wage negotiations  were 
completed.  Phase  II, which  established  a 5.5 percent  wage  guideline,  was 
in effect throughout  1972. Subsequent  phases  were more flexible.  Given 
the paucity  of observations  available  in the annual  data,  the policy  period 
is represented  (relatively  crudely)  by a dummy  variable  (PHASE) taking 
the  value  of unity  in 1972 and 1973 and  zero  otherwise. 
The final set of variables  is included  as a test for union-nonunion,  and 
union-union  wage spillovers.  The maintained  hypothesis  is that union 
groups  have a target  relative-wage  differential,  RW*, with reference  to 
nonunion  workers  and to other union groups  that they seek to maintain 
through  collective  bargaining.  If RW* represents  the target  union  relative 
wage  and U-1  is the  reciprocal  of the  unemployment  rate,  then 
Wt  -%  +  fl  UT1 +  #2 tPl  +y  (RW*  -  RWt1)+  E. 
In this equation,  y is positive and measures  the fraction  of the relative- 
wage disequilibrium  removed  during  negotiations  (when the dependent 
variable  is current  union wage changes). In the empirical  work  reported 
below, the target  relative  wage  is impounded  in the constant  term  and the 
following  regression  is estimated: 
(3)  Wu =  (E+  y RW*  +1  Ut.+  2  P.tl-y  RWt.,+  c. 
This specification  assumes  no change in the target differential  over the 
estimating  period.  To the extent  that  union  militancy  is indexed  by changes 
in union  membership,  as some  previous  studies  have argued,  this assump- 
tion  is consistent  with  the  facts  in the  private  sector. 
Nonunion  employers  may also wish to keep wages  within  a certain  dis- 
stance of the union scale, in order to reduce the probability  of union 
organization.  As noted earlier,  however,  this effect  may have been much 
weaker  during  the postwar  period  when  further  unionization  in the private 
sector  has  not been  extensive. 
In the regression  analysis  presented  below, the proportionate  differ- 
entials  between  wages  in unionized  manufacturing  and various  reference 
sectors are used as variables  for detecting  spillover  effects.  The propor- 
tionate difference is calculated as 100  (log  Wu -  log WI), where Wu is 
the union  wage  in manufacturing  and Wi is the wage  in the reference  sec- 
tor. In the regressions  for union wage changes,  a negative  coefficient  is 
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the regressions  for nonunion  wage changes.  The union-nonunion  differ- 
ential, NU (RW in equation  3)  is constructed  from the data for manu- 
facturing  from Current  Wage  Developments  referred  to above. There  are 
several  alternative  reference  sectors  for union-union  wage  spillovers,  some 
of which  have exhibited  dramatic  changes.  Foremost  among  these is the 
relative  increase  of nonmanufacturing  negotiated  wages, which  has been 
spearheaded  by, but  not restricted  to, changes  in construction  wages.  Data 
on negotiated  rates in all nonmanufacturing  are from Current  Wage  De- 
velopments  and are used to construct  the differential,  NM, with union 
rates in manufacturing.  The Bureau  of Labor Statistics  series on union 
wage  rates  in the building  trades  is also introduced  as a separate  reference 
wage and used to construct  the differential,  CON. Finally,  the late sixties 
and early seventies  saw a striking  growth  in unionization,  collective  bar- 
gaining,  and the relative  wage in the public  sector.  Yet there  are surpris- 
ingly  few time series  on wages  in the public  sector.  One of the few covers 
salaries of police and firemen  in major  metropolitan  areas. The differ- 
ential of this measure  relative  to union wage rates in manufacturing  is 
PUB. 
SPILLOVER  RESULTS 
The regression  model  in equation  3 was  used  to analyze  annual  changes 
in current  union, effective union, and nonunion wages for the period 
1960-75. A comparison  of the results  reported  in table  2 for the alternate 
dependent  variables  reveals  much  about  the sources  of the  relative  cyclical 
insensitivity  of union  wages. 
First, a comparison  of the regressions  for effective  wage changes  with 
nonunion  changes  confirms  that nonunion  firms  are more responsive  to 
labor  market  pressure  (compare  regressions  6 and 11).19  However,  most 
of the difference  in the average  wage  responsiveness  of the  union  and  non- 
union sectors  of manufacturing  appears  attributable  to the prevalence  of 
multiyear  contracts  in unionized  manufacturing,  where  only 1 percent  of 
labor agreements  covering  at least 1,000 workers  have a duration  of one 
19. This result coincides with the findings of economists who have attempted  to 
develop inferences about the wages of union and nonunion workers from the analy- 
sis of  average hourly earnings data. See Ashenfelter and others, 'Trade Unions," 
and George E. Johnson, "The Determination of Wages in the Union and Nonunion 
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Table 2. Wage-Adjustment  Regressions,  Union  and Nonunion 
Variable 
Unemployment  rateb  Price changes 
Type  of wage 
and regression  Constant  Up  U  P-i- 
Current  union 
1  5.550  -0.836  ...  0.334  0.573 
(7.88)  (4.74)  (2.87)  (3.28) 
2  -0.752  ...  0.114  0.345  0.517 
(0.87)  (4.12)  (2.72)  (2.74) 
3  0.764  ...  0.091  -0.052  0.523 
(0.74)  (3.24)  (-0.23)  (3.15) 
4  1.277  ...  0.078  0.018  0.291 
(2.15)  (4.87)  (0.20)  (2.82) 
5  1.592  ...  0.061  0.008  0.354 
(2.27)  (3.10)  (0.08)  (3.19) 
Effective  union 
6  3.184  -0.248  ...  0.587  ... 
(5.46)  (1.75)  (11.98) 
7  1.334  ...  0.033  0.580  ... 
(2.08)  (1.55)  (11.73) 
8  3.075  ...  0.006  0.133  ... 
(6.14)  (0.44)  (1.34) 
9  7.604  ...  0.015  0.287  ... 
(4.96)  (1.02)  (3.41) 
10  2.814  ...  0.005  0.322  ... 
(4.25)  (0.28)  (3.25) 
Nonunion 
11  5.254  -0.820  ...  0.547  ... 
(8.90)  (5.71)  (11.03) 
12  5.691  -0.843  ...  0.557  ... 
(6.165)  (5.55)  (10.37) 
Sources: Derived from text equation 3 using wage data from the following sources. Union and non- 
union, 1959-64, William Davis and Lily Mary David, "Pattern of Wages and Benefit Changes in Manu- 
facturing," Monthly  Labor Review, vol. 91 (February 1968), p. 43, and 1965-75, Diane C. Bayless, "Wage 
Gains for  Manufacturing Workers Show  Different Trends for Union  and Nonunion  Sectors in  1975." 
Current Wage Developments,  vol. 28 (July 1976), tables 2, 4, pp. 62, 63; building trades, U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1974, p. 219, and Mark Sieling, "Union  Wage Rates  in 
Building Trades," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 99 (July 1976), p. 39; public employees, Joan D.  Borum, 
"Starting Pay of Metropolitan Police, Firefighters Rose  6.5 Percent in  1974," Current Wage Develop- 
ments, vol.  27 (December 1975), table 4, p.  46;  nonnianufacturing, Current Wage Developments, vol. 
28 (April 1976), p. 46. 
a.  The regressions use annual data. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, The dependent variable 
is the median percentage rate of wage change in the respective sectors; see text for a detailed description. 
b. The  Perry weighted unemployment rate is used; see George L. Perry, "Changing Labor Markets 
and Inflation," BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 411-41. Robert J. Flanagan  653 
Manufacturing,  1960-75& 
Summary  statistic 
Incomes- 
Wage  differential  policy  Standard 
dummyh  error  of  Durbin- 
NU_ld  NM_le  CON_1  PUB_l1  PHASE  A'  estimate  Watson 
...  ...  ...  ...  -0.426  0.91  0.950  1.66 
(0.69) 
...  ...  ...  ...  -0.108  0.89  0.761  1.72 
(0.16) 
-0.389  -0.314  ...  ...  -2.497  0.92  0.666  1.60 
(2.28)  (2.15)  (1.91) 
-0.496  ...  -0.232  ...  -2.901  0.97  0.385  2.08 
(5.82)  (5.63)  (4.67) 
-0.192  ...  ...  -0.193  -1.943  0.97  0.429  1.80 
(4.80)  (4.88)  (3.51) 
...  ...  ...  ...  1.474  0.91  0.577  2.16 
(3.37) 
...  ...  ...  ...  1.539  0.90  0.591  2.25 
(3.44) 
-0.443  -0.356  ...  ...  -1.160  0.97  0.332  1.87 
(5.19)  (4.90)  (1.86) 
-0.336  ...  -0.152  ...  -0.513  0.96  0.378  1.83 
(4.34)  (4.03)  (0.86) 
-0.132  ...  ...  -0.119  0.273  0.94  0.442  1.88 
(3.33)  (3.03)  (0.48) 
...  ...  ...  ...  1.340  0.92  0.584  2.66 
(3.03) 
-0.019  ...  ...  ...  1.390  0.89  0.599  2.69 
(0.63)  (3.02) 
c.  Change in consumer price index, December to  December, defined as (Pt -  Pt_i)/P,s_,  where Pa is 
the index in a given December and PsI  is the index for the previous December. 
d.  Proportionate difference between the union and nonunion wage rates in manufacturing. NU  =  100 
(log  Wu -  log  Wa), where Wu -  union wages and Wn = nonunion wages. 
e.  Proportionate difference between  wage  rates  in  unionized  manufacturing  and  unionized  non- 
manufacturing (defined as above). 
f.  Proportionate difference between union wage rates in manufacturing and indexed wage rates in the 
building trades (defined as above). 
g.  Proportionate difference between union wage rates in manufacturing and the wages of public em- 
ployees as indexed by the maximum salary scales of police and firemen (defined as above). 
h.  The value of the dummy variable is unity in 1972 and 1973 (the years of the incomes policy of the 
Nixon administration) and zero in other years. 654  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
year or less. This conclusion  follows from comparing  the effect  of labor 
market  pressure  on current  and effective  union wage changes (for ex- 
ample, regressions  1 and 6).  The relationship  between current  union 
wage changes and labor market pressures,  as indexed by the Perry 
weighted  unemployment  variable,  is both economically  and statistically 
significant,  and  the  point  estimate  on the unemployment  term  is essentially 
the same as that obtained  in the nonunion  equation  (regression  11  ). In 
the more  comprehensive  measure  of effective  union  wages,  which  includes 
deferred  increases,  the point estimate  of the response  of union wages to 
unemployment  is substantially  lower  and  not quite  statistically  significant. 
Attempts  to rehabilitate  the influence  of labor  market  pressures  on effec- 
tive union wage changes  by the introduction  of lagged values of unem- 
ployment  did not change  the results  significantly.  The burden  of the evi- 
dence is that the impact  of labor  market  disequilibrium  is limited  to first- 
year wage changes  in union agreements,  but this impact  approaches  that 
observed  in the nonunion  sector  of the industry.  Indeed,  the results  imply 
that there is little difference  between  the two sectors  in the response  of 
current  wage decisions  to macroeconomic  policy impacts  on unemploy- 
ment.  Instead,  union  wage  inflexibility  is mainly  a by-product  of the dura- 
tion of labor  agreements. 
This story is complicated  to the extent that there are important  wage 
interdependencies  between  sectors.  If "customary"  wage differentials  are 
disturbed  during  business expansions,  but the opportunities  to restore 
them  occur  some years  later  when the labor  agreements  expire,  the sensi- 
tivity of even current  wage changes  to unemployment  may be offset by 
efforts  to regain  lost relative-wage  positions.  Regressions  3, 4, and 5 ex- 
plore the relative-wage  influence  on first-year  wage changes  in current 
union settlements.  Since  the variables  are  defined  as the (lagged) propor- 
tionate difference  between  the union wage in manufacturing  on the one 
hand and,  on the other,  the wage  in nonunion  manufacturing,  NU, union- 
ized nonmanufacturing,  NM,  the building  trades,  CON,  and the public 
sector, PUB,  each taken separately,  a negative  coefficient  is expected  if 
wage  interdependence  exists. 
Each set of spillover  variables  tested is statistically  significant  with the 
expected  sign, and the statistical  qualities  of the regressions  that include 
the relative-wage  variables  are superior,  as judged  by the improvement 
in the Durbin-Watson  statistic  and the fall in the standard  error  of the 
regression.  The regressions  confirm  the existence  of separate  channels  of Robert  J. Flanagan  655 
influence  through  which the nonunion  sector and other union contracts 
operate  simultaneously  on union settlements  in manufacturing.  Wage  in- 
creases  in the first  year  of currently  negotiated  contracts  restore  about  40 
to 50 percent  of the prior  year's  discrepancy  between  the actual  and  target 
union-nonunion  wage differential.  The response to interunion  relative- 
wage  disequilibria  is less pronounced,  although  still  statistically  significant. 
First-year  union wage changes  in manufacturing  make up just about 16 
percent of the relative-wage  disequilibrium  between union workers  in 
manufacturing  and  nonmanufacturing,  and  the coefficients  on the  building- 
trade and public-sector  differentials  indicate  similar  rates of response.20 
A similar  pattern  of relative-wage  coefficients  emerges  in the equations 
on effective  wage change (regressions  8, 9, and 10). Union wages  adjust 
most rapidly  to movements  in the union-nonunion  differential,  although 
the inclusion  of deferred  increases  in the measure  of effective  wage  change 
reduces  the size  of the coefficient.2' 
The major disturbances  in the relative-wage  relationships  between 
unions  occurred  during  periods  of inflation,  with the result  that the addi- 
tion of the relative-wage  variables  to the regression  is associated  with a 
fall in the magnitude  of the price-change  variable.  These results  suggest 
that money-wage  inflation  in the unionized  sector  may have reflected  less 
an increasing  sensitivity  to inflation  than a response  to increasing  dis- 
equilibrium  in interunion  and union-nonunion  wage differentials.  Once 
the spillover  variables  are included  in the effective-wage  regression,  for 
example,  the coefficients  on the inflation  variable  drop  to about  the mag- 
nitude  that was reported  in earnings-adjustment  equations  estimated  for 
periods  prior to the acceleration  of inflation  in the late 1960s. Indeed,  a 
literal  reading  of the regressions  on effective  wage  change  suggests  that  the 
20.  The various interunion differentials  are sufficiently  intercorrelated  in the an- 
nual data that it is not possible to untangle their separate  influences  on the dependent 
variable  when they are included  in the regression  simultaneously. 
21.  If RW is lagged, W' I appears on both sides of the regression  equation, plac- 
ing a restriction  on the coefficient  -y  (equation 3) and raising  the question  of whether 
wages in the reference sectors play the role attributed to them in the text. As an 
alternative specification,  the regressions  in table 2 were rerun with each component 
of  RW entered separately. Unfortunately, these regressions suffered from multi- 
collinearity (largely between union reference wage rates and lagged price changes). 
Nevertheless, in the union regressions,  Wt 1 enters negatively as expected (but with 
coefficients ranging from -  0.4 to  -  0.7 depending on the specification), and the 
coefficient on the nonunion reference wage is significant and positive, and ranges 
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responsiveness  of negotiated  wages  to price  inflation  would  have  been cut 
roughly  in half if the wage relationships  had remained  stable  throughout 
the period. 
How important  have relative-wage  disequilibria  been in the actual 
movements  of union  wages  in recent  years?  In figure  1, the relative-wage 
series  used in the regression  analysis  is graphed  for the period 1959-75. 
Of the differentials  examined,  the union wage in manufacturing  exceeds 
only the nonunion  manufacturing  wage. The earlier  regression  analysis 
indicates  that nonunion  wage changes are highly responsive  to market 
conditions  and  hence  likely  to alter  the equilibrium  differential,  but  union- 
wage adjustments  are highly sensitive to this differential.  In fact, the 
union-nonunion  relative-wage  series  has less variation  than  the interunion 
differentials.  From  a plateau  reached  early  in the sixties,  the union  relative 
wage mn  manufacturing  fell during the tight labor markets  of the late 
sixties,  and  created  an upward  pressure  on union  wages.  During  the 1967- 
70 period,  the level of NU relative  to, say, 1965 would  at most  have  added 
0.8 percentage  point a year to first-year  union wage changes  and 0.65 
percentage  point  to effective  union  wage  increases,  based  on the  regression 
results  in table 2. Since 1969, however,  NU has risen  to its highest  level 
of the period, moderating  union wage changes in recent years.22  The 
regression  results  in table  2 imply  that  first-year  increases  in current  nego- 
tiations  would  have  been as much  as 1.3 percentage  points  higher  in 1975 
and 2.2 percentage  points higher  in 1976 if the union-nonunion  differ- 
ential  had  been  at its 1969 level. 
The most dramatic  feature  of figure  1 is the extent  of the alteration  of 
gross interunion  wage differentials  since 1959. Union wages in manu- 
facturing  have fallen relative  to union scales in other  major  sectors;  the 
change  is particularly  acute  relative  to the building  trades  and the public 
sector.23  Particularly  during  the late sixties  and  early  seventies,  this differ- 
22.  The wage differentials  in figure 1 are unadjusted  for sectoral differences in 
labor quality and the like. For evidence that net union-nonunion  wage differentials 
have followed a similar path since 1967, see Orley Ashenfelter, "Union Relative 
Wage Effects: New Evidence and a Survey of Their Implications for Wage Infla- 
tion," Working  Paper 89 (Princeton University, Industrial  Relations Section, August 
1976;  processed). 
23.  The remarkable  increase in relative wages in unionized construction  has been 
followed by a rapid expansion of nonunion construction activity. See Herbert R. 
Northrup and Howard G. Foster, Open Shop Construction (University of Pennsyl- 
vania Press, 1975). The growth of the nonunion sector has stimulated  interest  among 
the national construction  unions in acquiring  greater  influence  over local bargaining 
arrangements  in the industry. Robert  J. Flanagan  657 
Figure  1. Wage  Rates  in Manufacturing  Unions  Relative  to Wages 
in Other  Sectors,  1959-75 
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ential  added  an  upward  pressure  on union  wages  in manufacturing,  despite 
the weaker  influence  of the interunion  differentials.  In the recession  year 
of 1971, for example,  the regression  results  imply  that  current  union  wage 
changes  in manufacturing  were around  2 percentage  points higher  than 
they would have been if the interunion  differentials  existing  in 1969 had 
been maintained.  During  the recession  in the early  seventies,  union  wage 
interdependencies  among major industrial  sectors tended to counteract 
the effects  of growing  unemployment  on negotiated  wages  in manufactur- 
ing, thereby  adding  significant  wage  inflexibility  in the face of a weaken- 
ing labor market.  Only since 1972 and 1973 has the widening  in major 
interunion  differentials  been halted or reversed,  reducing  spillover  pres- 
sures among  major  sectors  in the current  recession. 
What  influence  have these developments  had on wages  in the nonunion 
sector?  Early in the paper  it was noted that any tendency  to dismiss  the 
role of unions in the aggregate  wage-determination  process  on the basis 
of their extent of organization  of the labor force implies that "threat" 
effects,  or wage spillovers  from the union to the nonunion  sector, are of 
minor  importance.  Money-wage  increases  in nonunion  manufacturing  for 
1960-75 are analyzed  in the regressions  in the bottom  panel of table 2. 
Given the definition  of the union-nonunion  wage differential  in manu- 
facturing,  a significant  positive  coefficient  would  signify  an  operative  threat 
effect. However,  the spillover  variable  specified  in the nonunion  regres- 
sions does not approach  normal  standards  of statistical  significance.  Over 
the period  covered  by the analysis,  union  wages  in manufacturing  do not 
appear  to have influenced  wage increases  in nonunion  manufacturing. 
(When the components  of NU are entered  separately  in the nonunion 
regression,  the union reference  wage is negative  and not statistically  sig- 
nificant,  confirming  the absence  of significant  spillovers  from  the nonunion 
sector.) The absence  of a discernible  threat  effect  is perhaps  unsurprising 
during  a period  in which  private-sector  organizing  has not been very ex- 
tensive  or successful.  And if there  is no spillover  from  union  to nonunion 
wages, as this result suggests,  there is some question  of the efficacy  of 
wage-restraint  programs  that assume  that  the union  sector  is the leader  in 
the general  money-wage  dynamics  of the economy.  Whatever  the role of 
wage contagion  among  union jurisdictions,  the infection  apparently  has 
not reached  nonunion  workers  by a direct  route  in recent  years.24 
24.  For a parallel finding, see Johnson, "Determination  of Wages." Robert J. Flanagan  659 
Figure  2.  Annual  Rate of Change  of Union  and  Nonunion  Wage  Rates 
in Manufacturing,  1959-75 
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THE  INCOMES  POLICY  OF  THE  EARLY  SEVENTIES 
Incomes  policy  is frequently  proposed  as an auxiliary  to macroeconomic 
policies  that  have  to confront  wage  and  price  inflexibilities.  The movement 
of union and nonunion  wages  during  the period  of incomes  policy in the 660  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
early seventies is therefore  of interest.  Figure 2 graphs  the annual  rate 
of change  of union  and  nonunion  wages  over  the years  1959-75. The  long 
rise from 1964 of both of the union wage concepts  broke dramatically 
in 1972 and 1973 while  the policy  was operative,  only to be reestablished 
after the policy was lifted. However, nonunion  wage increases,  which 
tapered  off prior  to the imposition  of the policy, did not drop in parallel 
and  in fact  rose  in 1973. 
The regressions  in table  2 incorporate  a dummy  variable  (PHASE) to 
test for the effect of the incomes  policy of the Nixon administration  in 
1972 and 1973. While this represents  a rather  crude  test of the policy's 
impact  on the wage-adjustment  process,  limitations  in the data preclude 
some alternatives.  Nevertheless,  two interesting  findings  emerge  from a 
review of the PHASE coefficients.  First, the policy appears  to have re- 
strained  negotiated  wages,  but this effect  is clear  only in those equations 
that explicitly  account  for the influence  of relative-wage  disequilibria  on 
union  wages (equations  3, 4, and  5 in table  2).25 One  interpretation  of this 
is that  Phases  II and  III apparently  had some  success  in suppressing  union 
wage expectations  generated  by the disturbed  relative-wage  differentials 
of the late sixties.  Second,  the PHASE  coefficients  indicate  that  nonunion 
wage changes were significantly  higher during the policy period. The 
PHASE  coefficients  in the union  regressions  are  sensitive  to the particular 
reference-wage  comparisons  used and in some of the regressions  look 
large  relative  to inferences  that  others  have  drawn  from  studies  of earnings 
behavior.  These  observations  raise  the  possibility  that  important  structural 
changes  occurred  in wage determination  during  the period. To explore 
this issue further,  wage-change  relationships  for the union and nonunion 
sectors  were  reestimated  for the period  1960-71 and  used  to predict  wage 
changes  in 1972 and 1973. For the union  wage concepts,  regressions  in- 
cluding  spillovers  from  nonunion  manufacturing  and  unionized  nonmanu- 
facturing  are used for the predictions.  No relative-wage  influence  is in- 
cluded in the nonunion  regression.  The predicted  wage movements  are 
compared  with  actual  changes  in table  3. 
For unionized  manufacturing,  wage increases  were significantly  below 
predicted  values, and for 1972 the dominant  effect  appears  to have been 
the restraint  of first-year  increases.  Nevertheless,  there  is a striking  differ- 
25.  In these equations, the first price-change  term is insignificant.  Since prices as 
well as wages were controlled, the PHASE dummy is more likely to be significant 
in equations without explicit price terms as explanatory  variables. Robert  J. Flanagan  661 
Table 3. Actual and Predicted Wage Changes in Union and 
Nonunion  Manufacturing,  1972 and 1973 
Annual rate of change  in percent;  difference  in percentage  points 
Current  union  Effective  union  Nonunion 
Actual  Actual  Actual 
Pre-  minus  Pre-  minus  Pre-  minus 
Year  Actual dicted predicted Actual dicted  predicted Actual dicted predicted 
1972  5.5  7.2  -1.7  5.2  6.4  -1.2  5.0  3.6  1.4 
1973  5.7  6.5  -0.8  6.2  7.1  -0.9  5.6  4.1  1.5 
Sources: Actual, from figure 2; predicted, regressions 3, 8, and 11, respectively, in table 2, reestimated 
for the period 1960-71 without PHASE. 
ence between the policy impact on current union wage changes in table 3 
and  the estimate  of -2.5  percentage  points  obtained  from  data  for 1960- 
75 (regression  3 in table 2),  a finding  that suggests  important  structural 
changes  in the determination  of first-year  wage  increases  in current  settle- 
ments. This issue is pursued in the following section. 
As in table 2, the nonunion  sector  provides  a sharp  contrast  with the 
results  reported  for unionized  manufacturing.  Nonunion  wage  changes  are 
about 11/2 percentage  points  above the changes  predicted  on the basis of 
a regression on data for 1960-71-an  estimate that coincides closely with 
the PHASE  coefficient  in table 2  (regression 11).  The observed  wage 
changes  are quite  similar  in each sector  and are  generally  in the ball park 
of the 5.5 percent  guideline  of the control  period.  Yet the greater  respon- 
siveness of nonunion  wage changes  to labor market  conditions  resulted 
in predicted  wage  increases  during  the recession  of the early  seventies  that 
were well below the guideline.  The fact that wage increases  for both 
union and nonunion  workers  were so close to the 5.5 percent  standard 
suggests  that a guideline  form of incomes  policy applied  during  a reces- 
sion may cut in both directions. While it may temporarily  restrain (union) 
wages  that  otherwise  would  have  been higher,  it may also provide  a target 
for workers  whose wages would have been lower given their sensitivity 
to market conditions.26 
More generally, the empirical results of this section raise several ques- 
tions concerning the efficacy of a guideline form of incomes policy. The 
26.  One study of wage movements in the United Kingdom concluded that the 
use of a guideline during periods of high unemployment may have resulted in ab- 
normally high union wage changes. R. G. Lipsey and J. M. Parkin,  "Incomes  Policy: 
A Reappraisal,"  Economica, vol. 37 (May 1970), pp. 115-38. 662  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
case for such a policy often starts  with  presumed  wage  inflexibility  in the 
unionized  sector. While this assumption  is confirmed  in the analysis  of 
effective  union wage changes (which, as the broadest  measure  of annual 
union wage changes,  may be the concept of primary  concern  to policy 
officials), the inflexibility  appears  to result from the long duration  of 
labor agreements  rather  than from the insulation  of current  union wage 
settlements  from  market  influences.  In the nonunion  sector,  one finds  the 
greatest  degree  of wage  flexibility  and  presumably  the greatest  chance  that 
a guideline  policy might induce distortions.  Moreover,  nonunion  wage 
flexibility  is not tempered  by spillovers  from the union sector; within 
manufacturing  the significant  wage  interdependencies  flow  from  nonunion 
wages to union wages. Finally, the results  reported  in table 3 raise the 
possibility  that  during  a recession  a guideline  approach  may  have  perverse 
impacts on sectors with relatively  flexible wages. As noted above, the 
effects  of unemployment  and prices on wages in the union sector  can be 
dampened  by the effects  of relative-wage  disequilibria,  and  this may  itself 
be advanced  as a justification  for incomes  policy. The effects  of disequi- 
libria  appear  to be real, but it is unclear  whether  the guideline  approach 
eliminates  them  or merely  postpones  them  for another  day.27 
PREDICTIONS  FOR  1974  AND  1975 
In this section  the behavior  of union  and  nonunion  wages  in the current 
recession  is compared  with the wage increases  predicted  by alternative 
wage-adjustment  models. This is done by reestimating  various  models  of 
wage  determination  for 1960-73, and  using  them  to predict  wages  changes 
in  1974-75.  The regression  results are reported  in table 4. Predicted 
values,  and the differences  between  actual  and  predicted  values,  for 1974 
and 1975 are reported  in table 5. One purpose  is to assess  how well the 
models  explain  wage adjustments  in the deepest  of postwar  recessions.  A 
second  purpose  is to examine  further  how the wage-adjustment  process  in 
the union  and  nonunion  sectors  has  changed  during  the seventies,  focusing 
particularly  on the changing  role of prices  and  relative-wage  disequilibria. 
The predictions  from three models are developed separately  for the 
union and nonunion sectors. The simple structural  model includes  the 
27.  For some examples of "postponement"  in European  countries during the six- 
ties, see Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan, Wage Restraint:  A Study of Incomes 
Policies in Western  Europe (University of California Press, 1971). Robert  J. Flanagan  663 
reciprocal  of weighted  unemployment  and lagged price influences  and 
corresponds  to the models  underlying  regressions  2, 7, and 11 in table  2. 
The wage interdependence model used in predictions of union wages in 
manufacturing  adopts the regression  models with wage spillovers  from 
both  nonunion  firms  and  nonmanufacturing  unions,  and  corresponds  with 
regressions  3 and 8 in table  2. In view of the absence  of a significant  wage 
spillover  from union to nonunion  firms in the table 2 regressions,  no 
predictions  incorporating  lagged relative-wage  influences  are generated 
for the nonunion  sector.  The third  alternative  is an autoregressive  model 
in which nonunion  employers  are assumed  to adjust  wages to maintain 
their relative-wage  position with other nonunion  employers  while union 
wages are alternately  presumed  to follow recent wage changes in the 
union  and  nonunion  sector.28 
A comparison  of the nonunion  results  in tables  2 and  4 makes  clear  that 
very  little  change  has occurred  in the  wage-adjustment  process  in nonunion 
manufacturing  during  the seventies;  and in table 5 the simple structural 
model provides  predictions  of nonunion  wage changes  in 1974 and 1975 
that  are  superior  to those  of the autoregressive  model. 
The story  is more  complicated  in the union  sector.  The  results  in table  5 
indicate  that first-year  increases  in union wages have been smaller  than 
the changes  predicted  by either  the wage  interdependence  or simple  struc- 
tural models. The strikingly  large wage changes  predicted  for 1975 are 
traceable  to the 12.2 percent  increase  from  December  1973 to December 
1974 in the consumer  price index. However,  the structure  of the union 
regressions  has changed  during  the 1  970s. A review  of comparable  regres- 
sions estimated  for 1960-73 (equations  3 and 6 in table  4) and 1960-75 
(equations  3 and  8 in table  2) indicates  that  first-year  negotiated  increases 
were  less responsive  to CPI  changes  during  1974-75, and  more  responsive 
to relative-wage  disequilibria,  than the earlier  structural  equations  pre- 
dicted. The spread of cost-of-living  provisions  in collective bargaining 
agreements  may have reduced the influence  of changes in the CPI on 
first-year  negotiated  increases,  which  exclude  cost-of-living  increases. 
One outcome  of the change  in the structure  of the union  equations  be- 
tween table 4 and table 2 is that the 1974 and 1975 predictions  of the 
wage interdependence  model are not generally  as good as those of the 
simple  structural  model.  Neither  of them  performs  well, according  to com- 
28.  Ia each of the autoregressive  models, the wage changes in the current  year are 
regressed  on wage changes  lagged one and two years. 664  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 




ment  Price change  Wage  differential 
Type  of wage,  model,  rateb 
and regression  Constant  Up-'  P-1  2  NU-1  NM_1 
Current  union 
1. Simple  structural  -0.489  0.080  0.575  0.561  ...  ... 
(0.94)  (4.30)  (3.77)  (3.51) 
2. Wage inter-  0.778  0.061  0.406  0.403  -0.281  -0.224 
dependence  (1.11)  (3.11)  (2.57)  (2.60)  (2.17)  (2.02) 
3. Autoregressive  0.771  ...  ...  ... 
(union wages)  (1.05) 
4. Autoregressive  0.090  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
(nonunion  wages)  (0.14) 
Effective  union 
5. Simple  structural  1.502  0.018  0.666  ... 
(2.62)  (0.87)  (7.33) 
6. Wageinter-  2.983  0.002  0.242  ...  -0.397  -0.318 
dependence  (5.64)  (0.10)  (1.78)  (3.78)  (3.52) 
7. Autoregressive  0.214  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
(union wages)  (0.38) 
8. Autoregressive  0.712  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
(nonunion  wages)  (1.81) 
Nonunion 
9. Simple  structural  5.060  -0.756b  0.506  ...  ...  ... 
(8.50)  (6.07)  (6.76) 
10. Autoregressive  0.435  ...  ...  ... 
(0.70) 
Sources: See table 2. 
a.  For descriptions of the variables see notes to table 2. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
b.  The variable used for regression 9 is Up; see table 2, note b. 
parisons  with the 1975 predictions  from the autoregressive  models (see 
table 5). By rapidly  incorporating  the dampened  responsiveness  of union 
settlements  to price inflation  into their predictions-in other words, by 
not responding  as fully to the CPI rises of 1973-74 as the equations  esti- 
mated  through  1973 indicate  they would-these  models  have yielded  su- 
perior predictions  of current  union wage adjustments,  particuflarly  in 
1975.29 
29.  In the general analysis of union and nonunion wage behavior over the 1960- 
75 period, experiments with autoregressive  models in which current wage changes 
simply follow previous wage changes in their own sector or in a reference sector in- Robert J. Flanagan  665 
Union and Nonunion  Manufacturing,  1960-73% 
Change  in wages  Summary  statistic 
Incomes- 
policy  Union  Nonunion  Standard 
dummy  -  -  -  error  of  Durbin- 
PHASE  W  W  W.-1  W-_2  2  estimate  Watson 
-0.461  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.97  0.431  2.64 
(1.14) 
-1.921  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.98  0.367  2.45 
(2.28) 
...  0.869  -0.003  ...  ...  0.76  1.080  1.85 
(3.37)  (0.01) 
...  0.985  0.355  0.85  0.838  2.09 
(4.13)  (1.72) 
1.458  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.90  0.523  2.61 
(3.58) 
-0.927  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.97  0.339  2.29 
(1.23) 
...  0.933  0.070  ...  ...  0.82  0.654  1.99 
(4.32)  (0.40) 
...  ...  ...  0.687  0.282  0.87  0.525  2.41 
(4.61)  (2.19) 
1.430  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.94  0.428  2.98 
(4.32) 
0.800  0.138  0.74  0.834  1.75 
(3.38)  (0.67) 
To summarize,  this  section  has  focused  on differences  between  the  wage- 
adjustment  process  in the nonunion  sector  of manufacturing,  typified  by 
annual  wage decisions,  and the unionized  sector, in which the wages of 
about 99 percent  of the workers  are specified  in multiyear  labor agree- 
ments.  In some  important  respects  the  two  sectors  are  similar,  most  notably 
in the  influence  of labor  market  pressure  on current  wage  decisions.  Never- 
theless,  average  union  wage  changes  are  insulated  from  the current  market 
pressures  by the inertia  imposed  by multiyear  contracts,  and even the re- 
dicated that their statistical properties were inferior to the structural models that 
were presented  in table 2. 666  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  3:1976 
Table  5. Actual  and  Predicted  Wage  Changes  in Union and 
Nonunion  Manufacturing,  1974  and  1975 
Annual rate of change in percent;  difference  in percentage  points 
1974  1975 
Actual  Actual 
minluls  nzinufs 
Type  of wage  and  model  Predicted  predicted  Predicted  predicted 
Current  union 
1. Simple structural  8.4  -0.9  12.8  -4.2 
2. Wage interdependence  9.4  -1.9  12.5  -3.9 
3. Autoregressive 
(union wages)  5.7  1.8  7.3  1.3 
4. Autoregressive 
(nonunion  wages)  7.4  0.1  10.0  -1.4 
Effective  union 
5. Simple  structural  7.8  0.2  9.9  -1.9 
6. Wage interdependence  5.1  2.9  6.0  2.0 
7. Autoregressive 
(union  wages)  6.4  1.6  8.1  0.1 
8. Autoregressive 
(nonunion  wages)  6.0  2.0  7.8  0.4 
Nonunion 
9. Simple  structural  6.4  1.6  6.6  -0.3 
10. Autoregressive  5.6  2.4  7.6  -1.3 
Sources: See table 2. The predicted values are from the regressions in table 2 reestimated for 1960-73, 
and reported in table 4. Line 1 here is derived from regression 1 in table 4, line 2 from regression 2, and 
so on. 
sponse of currently  negotiated  union wages to these pressures  may be 
dampened  by their  response  to important  relative-wage  relations.  At the 
beginning  of the seventies,  disequilibria  in their  relative  wages  were  quite 
large  by postwar  standards,  and  they  have  become  an increasingly  strong, 
although  far from monolithic,  influence on union-wage  determination 
during  the decade.  Simultaneously,  the direct  influence  of prices  on con- 
tractual  wages appears  to have diminished  in the latest years. The net 
result  of these changes  is that while the wage interdependence  model ap- 
pears  to identify  important  influences  on uinion  wage determination,  and 
to provide  a superior  explanation  of union  wage  movements  over  particu- 
lar historical  periods,  the importance  of these  influences  has been shifting, 
altering  the estimated  structure  of the wage relation  and making  its pre- 
dictive  performance  inferior  to that of simpler  alternatives.  For the non- 
union  sector,  where  wage  determination  appears  uninfluenced  by spillover 
pressures,  such  structural  change  has  been  negligible. Robert J. Flanagan  667 
Wage  Imitation  among  Major  Collective  Bargaining  Agreements 
This  section  deals  with  the nature  of wage  interrelationships  among  ma- 
jor collective  bargaining  agreements.  The notion  that  wage  linkages  within 
the organized  sector  are  sufficiently  strong  that  most  unions  and  employers 
agree to "follow the pattern"  grew out of a series of virtually  identical 
wage rounds  in the immediate  postwar  period, when most major  unions 
renegotiated  their  contracts  on an annual  basis.  In the intervening  twenty- 
five years the contractual  arrangements  of the collective  bargaining  sys- 
tem have acquired  sufficient  diversity  (for example,  in duration  of agree- 
ment and cost-of-living  coverage) that maintaining  such rigid patterns 
would be difficult  even in the absence  of differential  market  influences. 
Yet popular  belief in the persistence  of such  patterns  continues.30 
Institutionally  determined  wage  imitation  is not proved  by demonstrat- 
ing that  patterns  of wage  similarity  exist in the economy.  As noted  earlier, 
many  "wage  patterns"  would  be expected  in an economy  without  unions, 
and  some  institutional  developments  may  simply  codify  practices  and out- 
comes that would have been observed  even in their absence.  Although 
institutional  codification  and institutional  rigidity  are not always  easy to 
distinguish,  some of the more commonly  cited "patterns"  appear  to fall 
within  the  former  category. 
Consider  multi-employer  negotiating  arrangements.  These represent  a 
centralization  of wage determination  that would not exist in an unorga- 
nized labor  market,  and may influence  the size of wage  increases.  At the 
same time multi-employer  bargaining  structures  represent  the ultimate 
codification  of an interfirm  wage  pattern,  and  hence  the ultimate  potential 
for institutional  wage  rigidity.  Where  are  they  found?  A key  feature  of U.S. 
collective  bargaining  arrangements  is that  centralized  bargaining  structures 
are  found  mainly  in markets  in which  substantial  variation  in wage  move- 
ments would be unlikely  in the absence  of unions. Where  they are ob- 
served, they most frequently  involve locally or regionally  competitive 
product  markets.  In this sense  they often  represent  the institutionalization 
of wage  similarity  that  would  have existed  under  competitive  forces.  Most 
multi-employer  bargaining  occurs  outside  of manufacturing;  over 90 per- 
cent of unionized  workers  in construction,  hotels and  restaurants,  whole- 
30. A recent example: "What  starts in the Big Three motor companies  eventually 
percolates through most of the economy." A. H. Raskin, "Breakthrough  on Work 
Hours," New  York Times, October 8,  1976. 668  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
sale trade,  and trucking  are covered  by such agreements.  In manufactur- 
ing they are most prevalent  in the competitive  apparel industry.  By 
contrast, centralized  bargaining  structures  are almost nonexistent in 
oligopolistic  sectors  of the economy.  Less than 3 percent  of the unionized 
workers  in the primary  metals, electrical  machinery,  nonelectrical  ma- 
chinery, transportation  equipment,  and utilities industries  are covered 
by multi-employer  agreements.3'  This pattern  reflects  the costliness  of en- 
forcing a multi-employer  bargain  to prevent chiseling;  and centralized 
negotiating  arrangements  tend to endure where the economic circum- 
stances  of the member  firms  are  similar-that is, where  the absence  of the 
bargaining  structure  would have yielded  substantial  wage similarity  any- 
way.82 
A second demonstrable  negotiated  pattern  appears  in major  oligopo- 
listic industries  in which  collective  bargaining  takes  place on a company- 
wide basis. These intra-industry  patterns  describe  settlements  in, for ex- 
ample, the automobile,  aerospace,  meatpacking,  and rubber  industries. 
Here  again,  the similarity,  if not the magnitude,  of wage  movements  would 
be expected  in the absence  of unions.  A major  puzzle  posed by negotia- 
tions  in these  industries  is the absence  of multi-employer  bargaining.  Cur- 
rent arrangements  tend to weaken employer  resistance  by posing the 
threat  of lost market  shares  during  a strike  while  spreading  union  financial 
resources  over a fraction  of the union's  industry-wide  membership.-3 
31.  U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  Characteristics  of Agreements  Covering  1,000 
Workers  or More, July 1, 1973, Bulletin 1822 (Government Printing Office, 1974), 
p.9. 
32. For further  discussion  of relationships  among bargaining  structures,  wage pat- 
terns, and wage levels in various industries,  see Lloyd Ulman, "Cost-Push  and Some 
Policy Alternatives,"  American Economic Review, vol. 62 (May 1972), pp. 245-46, 
and Lloyd Ulman, "Connective Bargaining and Competitive Bargaining,"  Scottish 
lournal of Political Economy, vol. 21 (June 1974), pp. 103-07. 
33. This discussion  leaves open the relationship  between bargaining  structure  and 
wage inflation.  Analyses of the effect of a multi-employer  structure  on wages do not 
yield unambiguous predictions (see references in note 32).  Evidence on the issue 
is fragmentary  and inconclusive.  The only data I am aware  of relating  union wage in- 
creases to bargaining structure are presented below. The data come from Current 
Wage Developments, vol. 28 (April 1976), p. 44, and unpublished  tabulations pro- 
vided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Wages and Industrial Rela- 
tions; they describe the annual rate of change of wages over the life of all major 
union contracts negotiated in each of the three years and suggest (at most)  that 
multi-employer  settlements  are not persistent  wage leaders. Robert J. Flanagan  669 
The wage patterns  described  above are limited to domains  in which 
market  forces would also breed substantial  similarity  in wage changes. 
The subsequent  analysis  focuses on the extent to which these contracts 
interact  to establish  much broader  patterns  of wage imitation.  The ap- 
proach  taken  is similar  to that  in the previous  section.  Wage adjustments 
in prominent  labor  agreements  in several  major  industries  depend  by  hypo- 
thesis on the employment  opportunities  for union workers,  past price 
changes,  and the relative  wage  in other  major  contracts.  Each of the col- 
lective  bargaining  situations  studied  yields settlements  that are character- 
istic of the pattern  followed within  that industry,  and regression  analysis 
is used to test for wage interdependence  among  major  collective  bargain- 
ing agreements. 
The analysis  of individual  contracts  complicates  the organization  of the 
regression  analysis.  Observations  should correspond  to actual  decisions, 
and in the present  context  the relevant  decision  is the settlement  of nego- 
tiations  over contract  terms.  By this measure,  the interval  between  obser- 
vations  has changed  over the postwar  period  as the duration  of collective 
bargaining  agreements  has lengthened.  This development  forces choices 
concerning  the appropriate  definition  of variables  and  greatly  reduces  the 
number  of observations  available  for the analysis  of each contract.  Pool- 
ing the data  from  different  contracts  would obscure  the channels  of wage 
interdependence  that are the focus of the study. In one important  case, 
automobiles,  the existence  of multiyear  contracts  throughout  the postwar 
period  means  too few observations  for sensible  regression  analysis.  (This 
does not, however,  preclude  tests of the effect  of auto workers'  wages  on 
labor  agreements  in other  industries.) 
The specification  of these regressions  generally  follows that of the pre- 
ceding  section,  but now each  observation  is a contract  agreement.  The de- 
pendent  variable  is the average  annual  percentage  change  in the contrac- 
tual wage rate over the life of the contract,  and includes  initial,  deferred, 
and  cost-of-living  wage  adjustments.  The  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics'  Wage 
Chronology  series,  from  which  the data  are  gathered,  evaluates  the overall 
wage change in absolute  terms, and generally  provides  a time series of 
wage-rate  information  only for selected  occupations  covered  by each  con- 
Bargaining  structure  1973  1974  1975 
Multi-employer  5.1  8.9  7.7 
Multiplant,  single employer  5.0  5.7  8.6 
Single plant, single employer  5.9  6.7  7.7 670  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
tract. Therefore,  the percentage  change  of wages of unskilled  workers  is 
used  in the  regression  analysis. 
Employment  prospects  of union  members  are represented  by the aver- 
age annual  percentage  change  in employment  of production  workers  over 
the life of the previous  contract  in the industry  that corresponds  most 
closely  with the coverage  of the contract.  The rate of change  of consumer 
prices  is also measured  as an annual  average  over the life of the previous 
contract.  The specification  is complicated  by the intermittent  presence  of 
formulas  for cost-of-living  allowances  in collective  bargaining  agreements. 
When a COLA arrangement  is operative,  contractual  wage increases,  as 
defined above, should be influenced  by current,  rather  than past, price 
changes.  Thus, when an existing  contract  included  a COLA, the current 
price  change  was entered  as an explanatory  variable. 
Two hypotheses  concerning  the nature  of negotiated  wage imitations 
were  examined.  The  first  was  the target-relative-wage  hypothesis  advanced 
in the preceding  section.  The second  assumed  that  unions  seek  to approxi- 
mate recent settlements  in other industries,  irrespective  of the current 
relative-wage  position  of the industries. 
In the end, the tests for the effects  of recent  settlements  were not suc- 
cessful and are not reported.  The variables  representing  wage changes 
provided  by recently concluded  negotiations  in other sectors were not 
significant  and  the signs  on the coefficients  varied  from  agreement  to agree- 
ment.  It may be that  this hypothesis  cannot  be tested  with available  data. 
As one examines  the postwar  history  of major  collective  bargaining  rela- 
tionships,  it becomes  clear  that  even  if the hypothesis  has  merit,  the  result- 
ing wage patterns  may be too complex  and too unstable  from negotiation 
to negotiation  to be captured  adequately  by regression  analysis.  As labor 
agreements  of different  durations  have developed,  negotiations  in industry 
i will first  lead and  then  lag negotiations  in industry  j. A strike  or a modest 
change in the expiration  date of a labor agreement  can also disturb  a 
traditional  leader-follower  pattern. 
The remaining  discussion  focuses on the target-relative-wage  hypothe- 
sis. The relative-wage  variables  take the same form as in the preceding 
section  with  the exception  that  they  now represent  the proportional  differ- 
ence in the wage of unskilled  workers  in sectors  i and j prior  to negotia- 
tions in sector i. The influence  of wages in the steel and auto industries 
relative  to others  is examined  for each  contract,  since  these are  frequently 
asserted  to be key bargains  that set wage patterns  for the economy.  The Robert  J. Flanagan  671 
effect  of the generally  growing  differential  in favor of the building  trades 
is also examined  for each contract.  The other interactions  tested were 
chosen  on a more  judgmental  basis. 
The results of the analysis  of disequilibrium  relative-wage  influences 
among  major  union agreements  are reported  in table 6. Only the coeffi- 
cients  on the relative-wage  variables  appear  in the table.  Given  the limited 
degrees  of freedom  available  in a world of multiyear  agreements,  each 
coefficient  was estimated  from a separate regression  in which the other 
variables  included  were  the rates  of change  of prices  and  industry  employ- 
ment,  as defined  above.  The performance  of the unreported  variables  was 
mixed, with the expected positive coefficients  on the employment  and 
price-change  variables  attaining  significance  for only a minority  of the 
bargaining  relationships  studied. 
The role of the relative-wage  disequilibria  in major contract  settle- 
ments  is also uneven.  While  the point  estimates  reported  in table  6 suggest 
that a falling wage relative  to other unions will increase  wage pressures 
in collective  bargaining,  few of the  relationships  are  statistically  significant 
and some coefficients  are too small  to be of economic  significance.  There 
is  some evidence that relative-wage  disequilibria  are most influential 
across agreements  negotiated  by a single union (for example,  the Steel- 
workers  in steel and aluminum;  the Automobile  Workers  in automobiles 
and  aerospace),  a finding  that  accords  with  discussions  in the institutional 
literature.  There are also some erratic  channels  of influence  from union 
wages  in the  building  trades. 
My own view is that  the results  in this section  are reasonably  suggestive 
that  relative-wage  disequilibria  play a significant  role in wage determina- 
tion in many collective  bargaining  relationships,  and that the statistical 
significance  of many  of these  influences  will become  clearer  as the number 
of observations  increases.  However,  this is quite different  from the view 
that  there  are  wage  patterns  that are so comprehensive  and  rigid  that  once 
a "key"  negotiation  is concluded,  wage  changes  are  essentially  determined 
for major  sectors  of the organized  economy.  The evidence  in tables 1 and 
6 is consistent  in indicating  that this view is simply  too strong.  Indeed, 
many of the wage patterns  that develop in collective  bargaining  appear 
rather  fluid,  with shifting  channels  of influence.  One important  topic for 
future  work  is the discovery  of what influences  such  changes in the imita- 
tive  patterns  among  unions. 4.  --  #  # 
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Summary 
The focus of this paper  has been the sources  of differential  wage flexi- 
bility  in union  and  nonunion  labor  markets  in manufacturing.  That  differ- 
ences in the cyclical sensitivity  of average  union and nonunion wage 
changes  exist  is clear  in the  postwar  data.  However,  it is also  clear  that  first- 
year  negotiated  wage  changes  are  almost  as sensitive  to labor  market  pres- 
sure as nonunion  wages.  Most of the inertia  in negotiated  wages is a by- 
product  of multiyear  labor  agreements.  In some periods,  a disequilibrium 
between  union  wages  in manufacturing  and wages  in the nonunion  sector 
or in other  unionized  firms  has been important  in current  negotiated  wage 
decisions,  muting  the influence  of the current  labor  market  situation.  Such 
relative-wage  effects  boosted  union  manufacturing  settlements  in the early 
seventies,  and appear  to have held them down in 1974-75, when rapid 
increases  in the CPI led to predictions  of union settlements  even larger 
than  those  that  occurred. 
In general  both the duration  of labor  agreements  and  relative-wage  dis- 
equilibria  may reduce  the immediate  influence  of standard  monetary  and 
fiscal policies on money wages in parts  of the organized  sector. On the 
other  hand,  the importance  of wage  contagion  is limited.  The greatest  im- 
pact of some highly  visible collective  bargaining  settlements  is on other 
agreements  negotiated  by the same union rather  than on union wages 
more generally.  Union wage movements  in different  industries  vary  con- 
siderably.  And, more important,  union  wage gains  do not appear  to leak 
out into the nonunion  sector  where  wages are lower and  more  flexible. 
One consequence  of labor  markets  with different  degrees  of wage  flexi- 
bility is that a guideline  approach  to incomes  policy may raise as well as 
lower  wage  increases  when  applied  during  a recession.  Although  the policy 
may succeed  in reducing  wages  where  they are  least  flexible,  it may  result 
in higher  wage changes  in the flexible-wage  sector  than otherwise  would 
have been observed.  The nonunion  sector in 1972 and 1973 appears  to 
be a case in point, with wages there  rising  faster  than would have been 
expected  on the basis of existing  market  conditions.  This finding  suggests 
that any direct policy interventions  into labor markets  should take full 
account  of the differing  wage flexibility  in different  markets,  and the be- 
havior  of wages that would therefore  be expected  in the absence  of such 
intervention. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Charles  C. Holt: This paper  probably  offers  the best explanation  yet of 
the rather  puzzling  fluctuation  in the union-nonunion  wage differential. 
Earlier  discussions  of the topic usually  stressed  a simple  dynamic  lag in 
union  wages,  but this  paper  goes further  both  in modeling  the way the dif- 
ferentials  change  cyclically  and in determining  their  size in a steady  state. 
The basis for Flanagan's  argument  is his assertion  that it is generally 
cheaper  for a firm  to maintain  its relative  position  by imitating  the wage 
changes of reference  firms  in relevant  product and labor markets.  Al- 
though  this seems  a reasonable  proposition,  I know of no body of theory 
or of evidence  to support  it, and I believe Flanagan  should have given 
us a fuller  treatment  than  he did. 
Table 1 reports  a striking  change  in the coefficient  of variation  of wage 
changes through  time, whose sources  pose a question.  I think there is 
other evidence, over a longer period of time, that indicates that such 
changes  are strongly  cyclical.  But the large  reductions  in the coefficient  of 
variation  from 1961 to 1975 for both the union and nonunion  sectors 
suggest  that they are structural;  and the same could be said of the rising 
trend  in the standard  deviations.  Finding  such  trends  could  be significant. 
The basic theoretical  specification  for the union sector is stated in 
terms of wage differentials.  This is an area that is undeveloped,  both 
theoretically  and empirically,  and Flanagan is to be commended  for 
having opened it up. Certainly,  introducing  a differential  between the 
sector  that  he is examining  and other  reference  sectors  as an explanatory 
variable  is a reasonable  way to go. It might  also be interesting  to explore 
some other  variables:  One is the change  in this differential.  If the differ- 
ential is actually  getting  wider it would have an even greater  effect on 
bargaining  behavior.  This effect  might  be captured  as a nonlinear  trans- 
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action term or explicitly  as the change in the differential.  Another is 
the change  in wages of the reference  group. Flanagan  uses differences 
between  two wage  levels,  but bargaining  in the union  sector  may actually 
be strongly  influenced  by a big wage increase  in the nonunion  sector in 
the  previous  year. 
Since the nonunion sector responds strongly  to unemployment  and 
general market  conditions,  putting nonunion wage changes as an ex- 
planatory  variable  into the union wage-change  equation  obviously im- 
poses a strong  collinearity  problem;  it might  be better  to use the deviation 
from the nonunion  wage to try to sort out whether  unemployment  was 
having  its impact  directly  on union bargaining,  or indirectly  through  the 
nonunion  sector. 
Because of this collinearity  problem, Flanagan  restricts  the number 
of these differentials  in table 2. In effect,  he puts them in one at a time, 
or at most two at a time. He shows that these differentials  substantially 
reduce the residual  error.  One could look at R2 and see if using all of 
the differentials  helped at all. If it did, that would suggest  a search  for 
a theoretical  and econometric  specification  for taking into account the 
multiple  differential  impacts. 
Figure 1 shows the various  differentials  that are used as explanatory 
variables. It  would have been interesting  to  plot these differentials 
weighted  by their regression  coefficients  so as to see not only how the 
various  explanatory  variables  move, but also how much  each contributes 
to union  wage  changes. 
In the comparisons  of predictive  performance  in table 5, it is discon- 
certing  that in three out of the four cases for the union equations  the 
autoregressive  equations  perform  better  than the basic model. This may 
be related to the need for an alternative  specification  that I suggested 
earlier.  If the wage changes  in the previous  year in the nonunion  sector 
do, in fact, heavily influence  current  collective bargaining,  that might 
explain  why these autoregressive  equations  perform  as well as they do. 
Flanagan  does talk about  the policy implications  of his results  as they 
relate  to guidelines.  The strong  carryover  effects  that he finds  from non- 
manufacturing  unions into the manufacturing  sector certainly  raise the 
question  about what kind of intervention  is called for. The very sharp 
leveling off of the differential  for the construction  industry  apparently 
held down wages elsewhere  as well; this effect ought to be called the 
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The policy implications  with regard  to the differential  on an industry- 
by-industry  basis should  be pursued  further.  For instance,  since the com- 
petitive  sector  has a strong  impact  in establishing  the nonunion  differential 
which in turn influences  union wages, improving  the operation  of the 
competitive  sector  through  measures  such as manpower  programs  ought 
to yield  broad  anti-inflation  benefits. 
In concentrating  on the union-nonunion  differential,  Flanagan has 
omitted many important  factors affecting  industrial  demand and labor 
supply.  While  his strategy  certainly  is understandable  at this stage of the 
work,  later  refinements  should  include  these  factors. 
Barry Bosworth:  I believe that Bob Flanagan  should be congratulated 
for writing  a paper on wage behavior  that is not another  attempt  to fit 
the aggregate  measure  of nonfarm  compensation  per manhour.  This is an 
interesting  paper that, by distinguishing  between changes  in negotiated 
and nonnegotiated  wage rates, develops several significant  hypotheses. 
I discovered  several  major  themes  from  the study. 
First, there is evidence  of interdependence  among  union wage settle- 
ments,  but  no such  spillover  effects  are  apparent  in the nonunion  sector. 
Second,  the apparent  lesser sensitivity  to current  market  conditions  of 
manufacturing  union wage rates compared  to nonunion  wage rates is a 
result  of multiyear  contracting  in the union sector;  first-year  settlements 
are  responsive  to labor  markets  just  as nonunion  wages  are. 
Third,  the incorporation  of a wage-wage  view of the inflation  process 
sharply  reduces  the estimated  direct  effect  of prices  on wages. 
Fourth,  wage-price  controls  or guidelines  may put a floor under  wage 
increases  in some sectors at the same time that they restrain  wages in 
others. 
Fifth, all the structural  models of union wages underpredict  the in- 
creases  of 1975. 
Finally,  there  are  no fixed  leader-follower  wage  patterns  in union  settle- 
ments. 
I would like to focus my comments,  first,  around  the statistical  results 
reported  in tables 2 through  5. The argument  that current  union settle- 
ments  and nonunion  wage changes  are equally  sensitive  to market  condi- 
tions is based on the nearly  identical  structure  of equations  1 and 11 in 
table  2. Equation  2 with  a reciprocal  of the unemployment  rate  is actually Robert J. Flanagan  677 
used as the basic structural  equation  for unions  in later  applications,  but 
its statistical  performance  is similar  to that  of equation  1. 
The results  of table 5, however,  show  that  the structural  equations  fore- 
cast a much different  rate of wage increase  for the union and nonunion 
sectors.  From those results  it appears  that wage behavior  is highly  infla- 
tionary  in the union  sector  compared  to the  nonunion  sectors.  Incidentally, 
the sharply  higher  predicted  level of union settlements  in recent years 
cannot  be traced  to imitative  effects  since equations  with relative  wages 
and the structural  version  of the equation  forecast  similar  large  increases 
in 1974 and 1975. 
There  are, I believe,  two possible  explanations  for this result.  First,  the 
equations  of tables 2 and 4, which are estimated  for different  periods, 
indicate  somewhat  different  structures  when the sample  period  is varied. 
Second,  the use of the reciprocal  of the unemployment  rate  in the union- 
sector predictions  may cause a large difference  in the projections  for 
1974-75 compared  with  the nonunion  sector  even  if the equations  are  not 
so different  over the sample period. This difference  between  the linear 
and  nonlinear  unemployment  variables  becomes  important  during  periods 
like the 1970s, when  the unemployment  rate  is changing  sharply.  For ex- 
ample,  the rise in unemployment  between  1973 and 1975 translates  into 
a 1.4 percent  reduction  in current  union  wage settlements  using  the non- 
linear  version  of equation  2 in table 2 compared  with  a 2.5 percent  reduc- 
tion using  the linear  form represented  by equation  1 in that table. 
All this leads me to wonder  whether  the equations  for current  wage 
adjustments  are,  in fact, stable  enough  functions  to permit  generalizations 
about the behavior  of union wages. Certainly,  on the basis of the results 
of table 4, one would not have concluded  that union wages under  new 
contracts  respond  to market  conditions  in a fashion similar  to nonunion 
wages. 
Flanagan's  argument  that  wage  guideposts  under  the  Pay  Board  induced 
higher  settlements  in the nonunion  sector  is interesting  but  puzzling.  How 
is it that this sector seems to be insensitive  to spillover  effects  from the 
union sector,  yet is sharply  affected  by a government  announcement  of a 
target?  In addition,  why was there no apparent  effect in 1962-66 but a 
strong  effect  in 1972-73? 
The distribution  of these wage adjustments  in 1972-73 reveals some 
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to 1971 only because  more workers  got increases  (83.2 versus  70.2 per- 
cent) rather  than because  increases  that were obtained  were larger  (the 
median  increase  declined  from 5.5 to 5.2 percent). In 1973, the median 
increase did rise to 6.0 percent,  but the proportion  receiving  increases 
jumped  again  to an  historical  high  of 90.1 percent. 
The apparent  acceleration  of wage increases  in the nonunion  sector 
during  the control  period  may revolve  around  merit  increases,  which  are 
excluded  from this wage series and which required  special  justifications 
under  Pay Board  procedures.  In view of the very  large  rise in the propor- 
tion of workers  receiving  (general) increases,  one explanation  for Flana- 
gan's result is that the controls program  led many firms to shift from 
merit  increases  (which  are  not recorded  in the data) to general  increases. 
An examination  of the distribution  of wage increases  in 1971-73 sup- 
ports the conclusion  that controls  reduced,  not increased,  wage changes. 
The frequency  of increases  of less than 4 percent  actually  rose in 1972 
and the frequency  of increases  of more than 6 percent  declined  sharply. 
Thus the controls  worked  to pull down large  increases  without  reducing 
the frequency  of small  increases.  As I already  noted, the median  increase 
declined  from 5.5 to 5.2 percent.  Thus Flanagan's  argument  is not sup- 
ported  in 1972. 
However,  in 1973 the frequency  of increases  below 4 percent  declined 
sharply-supporting Flanagan's  argument.  But the frequency  of settle- 
ments in the 4-6  percent range also declined. The rise in the median 
settlement  is accounted  for by a sharp expansion  in the proportion  re- 
ceiving  increases  above 6 percent-particularly  above 12 percent.  Thus 
the median  rose primarily  because  of a sharp  rise in the number  of ap- 
parent  violators.  It seems that wages  rose as fast as they did in 1973 be- 
cause the wage standard  was frequently  ignored,  not because  it pulled  up 
wages  that  would  have  risen  more  modestly  in its absence. 
Given  the problems  of interpreting  the rise  in the proportion  of workers 
receiving  general  increases  and the changing  distribution  of the increases, 
I think Flanagan's  conclusion  on the result of wage controls is rather 
strong. 
Robert J. Flanagan:  Barry Bosworth  notes correctly  that the evidence 
indicates  that the structure  of the wage-adjustment  process in the orga- 
nized sector has changed  during  the seventies.  This is hardly  a surprise, 
in light of previous  experience  with models  of the rate  of change  of earn- Robert J. Flanagan  679 
ings or total compensation.  The novelty  of the results  is in the stability  of 
the nonunion  sector;  the sources  of instability  in more aggregated  wage 
equations  are apparently  to be found  in the organized  sector. 
Bosworth also discusses the distribution  of nonunion wage changes 
during  1972 and 1973. I find the distribution  data interesting,  but hard 
to interpret  without a model of what would have been expected  in the 
absence  of the incomes  policy. If the policy is stimulated  by a concern 
with the average  rate  of money-wage  changes  and one effect  of the policy 
is to increase  the number  of firms  paying  positive increases,  this effect 
should  be considered  in assessing  the impact  of the policy. 
Charles  Holt suggested  as an alternative  to the target-relative-wage  hy- 
pothesis  in the paper that differences  in the rate of change  of wages in 
sectors  i and j may influence  wage changes  in sector i. I tested for this 
mechanism  while preparing  the paper  but found little empirical  support 
for it. 
General  Discussion 
A good deal of discussion  centered  around  the proper  interpretation  of 
relative-wage  variables  in the union-wage  regressions.  Robert Hall and 
several  others  felt that, rather  than implying  that imitative  effects  linked 
manufacturing  union  with  nonunion  (and other  union) wages,  the regres- 
sions might reflect simply the less responsive  nature of manufacturing 
union  wages  resulting  from  the three-year  bargaining  cycle. On this inter- 
pretation,  what appears  to be a response  by the unionized  sector to the 
wage  differential  between  the sectors  is actually  a delayed  market  response 
to the original  cause  of the movement  in the nonunionized  sector's  wages. 
Hall stressed  that this alternative  interpretation  had very different  policy 
implications;  for instance,  some intervention  in nonunion  wages would 
not influence  union wages.  Flanagan  disagreed  with  this interpretation  in 
part because the relative-wage  influence  is discerned  even when sector- 
specific  labor market  variables  are used in the regression  analysis,  but, 
more important,  because  of the direction  of the relative-wage  influence: 
wages in the high-wage  unionized  sector respond  to relative-wage  "dis- 
equilibria,"  but wages  in the low-wage  nonunionized  sector  do not. If the 
relative-wage  variable  were  merely  a proxy  for quit-rate  pressures  on em- 
ployers,  one would  expect  it to have a significant  influence  on wage  deter- 680  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1976 
mination  in the nonunionized  sector.  He also noted  that  lagged  unemploy- 
ment and  inflation  variables  had not displaced  the relative-wage  variables 
in regressions  and that the lagged unemployment  variables  had always 
been statistically  insignificant. 
William  Poole reasoned  that the relative-wage  terms  could be serving 
as proxies  for price  expectations,  filling  this  purpose  better  than  the  lagged 
price terms that were also tried in the equation.  Other  discussants  sug- 
gested alternative  explanatory  variables  that might  establish  whether  the 
relative-wage  terms truly represented  imitative effects or were proxies 
for other effects.  Christopher  Sims, noting that the autoregressive  equa- 
tions have performed  relatively  well in projecting  wage changes,  argued 
for exploring  that type of model along with the relative-wage  terms in 
order  to pin  down  the  structural  role  of the  latter. 
Martin  Feldstein  was concerned  that the dependent  variable  might  be 
misspecified  since current  wage changes omitted  increases  arising  from 
cost-of-living  allowances,  fringe  benefits,  and  merit  pay increases.  Robert 
Gordon  voiced surprise  that Flanagan's  reported  price coefficients  were 
small enough  that the Phillips  curve had a substantial  negative  slope in 
the long run, contrary  to his own and others'  recent  research  findings.  He 
noted that the price coefficients  might be biased downward  both by the 
omissions  Feldstein  had pointed  out in the dependent  variable  and  by the 
use of the consumer  price  index as an independent  variable  rather  than a 
measure  of producer  prices.  The latter  effect  would  be particularly  notice- 
able in 1974 and 1975, when  increases  in import  and  food prices  were  so 
large and were never  fully incorporated  into wages. He pointed  out that 
wage equations  would overpredict  in 1974 and 1975, as Flanagan's  do, 
if the CPI were indeed  not the structurally  appropriate  price  variable. 
Franco  Modigliani  was  skeptical  about  the  conclusion  that  the  union  and 
nonunion  sectors  were  comparably  responsive  both  to labor  market  condi- 
tions and to inflation.  In his own research,  he had found that, compared 
to nonunion  wages, union wages were more responsive  to inflation  and 
less responsive  to unemployment.  He noted that the equations  Flanagan 
fitted  through  1973 also showed  this characteristic. 
Regarding  his choice  of dependent  variables,  Flanagan  emphasized  that 
the paper  seeks to explain  the behavior  of contractual rates  in the union 
and nonunion  sectors  and therefore  the results  would not necessarily  be 
expected  to parallel  findings  from studies  of earnings  or total compensa- 
tion. Indeed, a comparison  of studies  based on these alternative  wage Robert J. Flanagan  681 
concepts  provides  some clues to the behavior  and  role of wage  drift  in the 
economy.  The present  regression  results  on contractual  settlements  indi- 
cate that workers  are fooled in their contractual  negotiations,  and data 
on the different  gains of workers  with and without  COLA provisions  in 
their contracts  do not overturn  this perception.  The behavior  of wage 
drift,  which  links contractual  wages  to actual  earnings,  is strongly  related 
to price inflation  and may reconcile  this paper with studies  of earnings 
that  identify  a natural  unemployment  rate. 